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INTRODUCTION

On June 26, 2000, scientists announced at a White House news
conference that they had completed mapping the human genome
sequence, the human race's genetic blueprint. 1 This pronouncement
generated tremendous and well-deserved excitement. Genomics, the
study and application of genetic information, promises to be an
unparalleled tool for improving public health. 2 Genetic testing can
identify asymptomatic individuals who are at risk of becoming ill
themselves or bestowing illness on their children. 3 As a result,
individuals who test positive can take prophylactic measures to slow
or stop disease and can also reduce the births of progeny at high risk
of compromised health. 4 At the same time, predictive genetic testing
Professor of Philosophy, San Francisco State University.
Assistant Professor of Law, College of William & Mary School of Law; National Institute
of Disability Rehabilitation and Research ("NIDRR") Mary Switzer Research Fellow (2001-02).
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law librarian Fred Dingledy and law student Holland Tahvonen for their superlative researcl:).
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1.
Nicholas Wade, Reading the Book of Life: The Overview: Genetic Code of Human Life is
Cracked by Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at Al. For a general overview, see Ari Patrinos
& Daniel W. Drell, Introducing the Human Genome Project: Its Relevance, Triumphs, and
Challenges, 36 JUDGES J. 3 (1997).
2.
See generally UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS MEDICAL CENTER, GENETICS EDUCATION CENTER,
at http://www.kumc.edu/gec/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2002) (providing information on the use of
genetic information).
3.
See id.
4.
The ability to alter one's genetic material does not yet exist. However, profound ethical
issues will be presented when such technology comes to the fore. See, e.g., George J. Annas, The
Man on the Moon, Immortality, and Other Millennia[ Myths: The Prospects and Perils of Human
Genetic Engineering, 49 EMORY L.J. 753, 779-82 (2000) (urging the adoption of international
rules to govern scientific advances that threaten the integrity of the human race); see also
Michael J. Reiss, What Sort of People Do We Want? The Ethics of Changing People Through
Genetic Engineering, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL 'y 63, 76-85 (1999) (evaluating the
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threatens unprecedented harm in its potential to engender (and then
defend on the grounds of alleged statistical probability) discriminatory
treatment in employment. 5 Consequently, scientists most involved in
the Human Genome Project6 and politicians most supportive of it 7
recommend strong legal protections against genetic discrimination.
Nevertheless, while the Constitution8 and the Privacy Act of
9
1974 provide some protection against the collection, use, and
dissemination of genetic information on privacy grounds, effective
federal regulations specifically protecting individuals from genetic
discrimination in employment are almost nonexistent. Specifically, a
single executive order bars federal agencies from discriminating in
employment on the basis of "genetic information." 10 Despite repeatedly
voiced intentions, Congress has yet to pass legislation specifically
prohibiting misuse of genetic information in the area of employment,
although a five-year-old bill is once more pending.1 1 Notably, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has had mixed
initial success in applying the antidiscrimination provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 12 to the realm of genetic
discrimination. 13 By contrast, the scope of state statutes varies by
jurisdiction. About half of the jurisdictions prohibit workplace

ethical acceptability of somatic gene therapy, germ-line therapy, and somatic or germ-line
modification).
5.
While we discuss employment and health care related aspects of these potential harms
throughout this Article, it bears noting that the potential harm we describe also extends to other
areas such as immigration and workmen's compensation.
6.
One such scientist is Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the National Human Genome
Research Institute. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Using Gene Tests to Customize Medical Treatment,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999, at Al.
7.
For example, while Dr. Francis Collins "prais[ed] the mapping announcement as having
discovered the 'book of life,' " President Clinton cautioned, "[W]e must guarantee that genetic
information cannot be used to stigmatize or discriminate against any individual or group."
Reading the Book of Life: White House Remarks on Decoding of Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2000, at F8.
8.
The Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments are particularly applicable. U.S.
CONST. amends. IV, V, XIV. See discussion infra Part II.A.
9.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
10. See Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6,877 (Feb. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Executive
Order]. The promulgation's formal title is "To Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment
Based on Genetic Information." Id.
11. See Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act, H.R. 602,
107th Cong. (2001). The discussion in Part III.E examines how this putative legislation fits
within existing theoretical frameworks. See generally Jeremy A. Colby, An Analysis of Genetic
Discrimination Legislation Proposed by the 105th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 443 (1998)
(explaining that Congress has enacted legislation to prevent abuse of genetic information but
that the legislation leaves loopholes for genetic discrimination to occur).
12. 42 u.s. c. § 12101 (2000).
13. See infra Part III.B-D.
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discrimination on the basis of genetic information, and a handful of
jurisdictions have established individuals' property rights to their
personal DNA information. 14
What federal protection that does exist or 1s under
consideration-as public law, executive order, or agency guidelinehas been developed within theoretical frameworks that fit poorly with
the realities of genetic discrimination. These statutes, orders, and
guidelines have been designed either to protect against violation of
individuals' privacy or to ensure their equal treatment in obtaining
social goods, services, and opportunities by prohibiting discriminatory
actions. 15 Ethicists and legal scholars divide on whether these harms
are properly conceptualized as "discrimination" and whether privacy
or equal opportunity is the main right we need to protect. 16
In this Article we argue for the creation of an equality-based
protection similar to the protection that exists for race and sex
discrimination. In doing so, we explore the confluence of genetic and
disability discrimination and discuss some problems inherent in
current approaches to statutory protection in both of these areas.l 7 We
show that the ADA, as well as current and proposed genetic
discrimination laws, bifurcates the population into protected and
unprotected groups. The ADA and specialized genetic discrimination
law protect different groups that are, essentially, mirror images of
each other while leaving an important part of the population
unprotected. 18 In practice the ADA applies only to those individuals
who are seriously symptomatic, 19 while genetic discrimination law
extends only to those who are either nonsymptomatic20 or
asymptomatic. 21 Falling between these two poles and thus lacking
14. One example, infra note 130 and accompanying text, is the 1996 New Jersey Genetic
Privacy Act, N.J. REV. STAT. § 17B:30-12 (1996).
15. While an analysis of these alternative protection models is set forth in Parts II-III, it
bears noting that this duality exists internationally as well. See generally Aart C. Hendriks,
Genetics, Data Protection, and Non-Discrimination: Some Reflections from an International
(Human Rights) Law Perspective, Position Paper Prepared for the Public Hearing of the Study
Commission on the Law and Ethics of Modern Medicine on 'Consequences of Genetic Diagnostic'
(Berlin), Oct. 16, 2000, available at http://www.bundestag.de/ftp/pdf_arch/med_hen.pdf.
16. Assertions that treating people differently based on their genetic makeup is logical
rather than discriminatory are set forth and addressed below in Part IV.B.
17. See infra Part III.
18. Id.
19. "Seriously symptomatic" refers to those individuals whose symptoms substantially limit
major life activities.
20. "Nonsymptomatic" refers to those individuals who have no symptoms.
21. "Asymptomatic" refers to those who have a disease with a known causative agent but
who have not shown symptoms of that condition. One example is an individual, like Sydney
Abbott (who we discuss in the context of her Supreme Court case in Part III.C-D), who tests
positive for the virus that causes AIDS (HIV) but is asymptomatic.
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protection is a large group of presymptomatic individuals with genetic
anomalies that may never be expressed or, if expressed, may not
manifest as unmitigatable functional impairments. 22 Because
excluding this latter category of individuals from labor . market
participation (and attendant social opportunities) is probabilistically
unjustifiable as well as enormously costly to society, we advocate their
inclusion in the classification of the group targeted for genetic
discrimination protection. 23 We also set to rest fears that broadly
extending protection will increase transactional costs for everyone. 24
In making these assertions, we therefore diverge widely from existing
legal scholarship. To date, commentators have advocated either
greater application of the ADA to cases of genetic discrimination, or
else the enactment of new legislation addressed solely to genetic
discrimination, without either noting or addressing the exclusion from
coverage of an important class of presymptomatic individuals. 25
Part I describes predictive genetic testing. 26 It then considers
genomics' most pertinent potential benefits and costs, those of
regulating risks of illness and of discriminating against individuals on
the basis of that information. 27 Part II evaluates the privacy model of
protection and explains how this framework fails to correspond to the
challenges presented by the misuse of genetic information in the
workplace. 28 Part III assesses existing and potential disability and
genetic antidiscrimination models and their limitations. 29 Part IV
begins by examining how these antidiscrimination approaches

22. See infra Part IV.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. An early and well-argued example is Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in
Employment and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 Hous. L. REV. 23 (1992). For a more
recent example, see Eugenia Liu, Bragdon v. Ahbott: Extending the Americans with Disabilities
Act to Asymptomatic Individuals, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y 382 (2000). A lone exception
among legal academic treatments is the brief (but astute) "counterpoint" essay, Henry T. Greely,
Genotype Discrimination: The Complex Case for Some Legislative Protection, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1483 (2001). Moreover, although we do not explicitly engage their assertions in this Article,
commentators have either supported or rejected the doctrine of genetic exceptionalism by
arguing that protection against genetic discrimination requires specially targeted legislation
because of the unique characteristics of genetic information or that familiar broad approaches to
protection will suffice because genetic information introduces no new problems. See, e.g., Sonia
M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics
Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669 (2001). We agree with genetic exceptionalists as to the
especially problematic character of genetic information, but believe that advantage is not
necessarily gained by specifically targeted employment protections.
26. See infra Part LA.
27. See infra Part I.B-C.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part III.
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bifurcate the population into protected and unprotected groups while
leaving the large group of presymptomatic individuals for whom
mitigating measures may be effective against the manifestation of
genetic .disease unprotected from discrimination. 30 Part IV proceeds to
demonstrate how excluding this latter category of individuals from
employment opportunities is both probabilistically unjustifiable and
enormously costly to society. 31 To ensure that this group of individuals
receives equality of opportunity, we develop a new paradigm that
safeguards individuals against genetic discrimination on an equality
basis similar to the protection extended to race and sex. 32 Part IV
concludes by discussing what such paradigm-shifting legislation would
entail. 33
I. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PREDICTIVE GENETIC TESTING
The potential benefits of predictive genetic testing as a risk
regulator are enormous, limited only by the rate at which scientists
acquire greater knowledge of the human genome and its
applications. 34 Concurrent with these benefits are prospective harms
that could arise from misuse of this information to discriminate
against individuals on the ground of statistical probability.
A. Predictive Genetic Testing

Predictive genetic testing typically is used to learn whether
individuals who do not currently exhibit symptoms of certain diseases
are at a higher than usual risk of developing them. The disease may
be caused by a variation in a single gene, may be polygenic, or may
result from environmental factors that are exacerbated by genetic
factors. 35 Predictive genetic testing usually involves examining sample
material taken from the individual whose degree of risk is being

30. See infra Part IV.A.
31. See infra Part IV.B.
32. See infra Part IV.C.
33. See infra Part IV.D.
34. We focus in this Article on the public health model of genetic policy. For a treatment of
two other models, see Lori B. Andrews, A Conceptual Framework for Genetic Policy: Comparing
the Medical, Public Health, and Fundamental Rights Models, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 221 (2001).
35. See generally ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY
59-115 (Lori B. Andrews et a!. eds., 1994) (providing a general overview of predictive genetic
testing).
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assessed. 36 Sometimes, however, family members are tested to itlentify
genetic markers that suggest the existence of a heritable anomaly. 37
Tests used to make predictions about asymptomatic people
may also be used as a diagnostic tool after symptoms appear. 38 Genetic
testing can indicate that unusual respiratory infections are the result
of cystic fibrosis, 39 that elevated cholesterol arises from
hypercholestrolemia rather than diet, 40 or that neurological symptoms
herald the onset of Huntington's disease. 41
The degree of probability with which a genetic test predicts the
onset of disease depends on many factors, among which are variances
in gene expression, accuracy of the test, and the stability of linkage
between genetic markers and suspect genes. 42 Only a few diseases are
caused by genetic anomalies with one hundred percent penetrancethat is, genes whose presence invariably leads to development of the
disease. 43 Some genetic tests suffer from a high occurrence of false
positives and/or false negatives. 44 And genetic recombination can
interfere with the predictive value of genetic markers. 45 Nevertheless,
commentators have observed that "despite these known uncertainties
and imprecisions, our aversion to disability is so great that people who
receive a positive result for a disabling genetic condition may be
stigmatized."46

36. In a minority of examples, the differential reaction of the eyes of people who have
Alzheimer's disease to dilute solutions of Tropicamide can he used as a diagnostic tool. See
Predictive Testing: A Bite of the Apple, HARV. HEALTH LETTER, June 1, 1995, at 20, available at
1995 WL 10430163. A thorough and technical outline is set forth in Neil A. Holtzman et al.,
Predictive Genetic Testing: From Basic Research to Clinical Practice, 278 SCIENCE 602 (1997).
37. Sec generally DORIS TEICHLER·ZALLEN, DOES IT RUN IN THE FAMILY?: A CONSUMER'S
GUIDE TO DNA TESTING FOR GENETIC DISORDERS (1997).
38. Id.
39. Faulty genes can result in excessively salty sweat secretions that adhere to lung
coating· mucus, which is part of the clinical picture of cystic fibrosis. See Daniel Green, Testing
Ground for Gene Therapy: Cystic Fibrosis is Heavily Researched but Progress has been Faltering,
FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 27, 1996, at 12.
40. See generally A. Simon et al., Comparison of Cardiovascular Risk Profile Between Male
Employees of Two Automotive Companies in France and Sweden, 13 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 885
(1997) (assessing risk factors).
41. Among the indicators of Huntington's disease are chorea and dementia. See generally
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 343 (27th ed. 2000).
42. See generally James P. Evans et al., The Complexities of Predictive Genetic Testing, 322
BRIT. MED. J. 1052, 1052-56 (2001).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See infra Part IV.B (providing a greater exposition of these difficulties).
46. Ani Satz & Anita Silvers, Disability and Biotechnology, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 173 (Thomas Murray & Maxwell
Mehlman eds., 2000).
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To mitigate responsibility for an employee's injury or disease,
an employer might argue that the individual was pathologically
disposed to such an outcome by, for instance, a gene for carpal tunnel
syndrorpe ("CTS") 47 or beryliosis. 48 In this regard, confidence in the
accuracy of genetic testing varies greatly, with a tendency to
exaggerate in both directions. Neither now nor in the future will
someone's genetic makeup forecast that person's future health
condition with certainty. 49 On the other hand, it is equally misleading
to say that basing health predictions on genetic testing is "little more
than medical speculation."5°

B. Potential Benefits of Predictive Testing
Predictive testing can have several benefits. Predictive genetic
testing can reveal individuals' predisposition for genetic conditions
associated with disability. 51 When families display a high incidence of
an early onset heritable disease, a positive result may enable
individuals to prepare for the condition's onset. 52 In some conditions,
such as hemochromatosis 53 and Wilson's disease, 54 prophylactic
measures to prevent or delay symptoms or therapeutic measures to
mitigate or eliminate symptoms may be effective. 55 Detection within a
medical setting may confer the indirect benefits of clinical quality
controls, genetic counseling, and physician fiduciary obligations. 56
47. See Rosalyn S. Carson·DeWitt, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MEDICINE 599-600 (1999) (delineating the possible origins of CTS).
48. Beryliosis is "[b]eryllium poisoning ... from inhalation of beryllium." See STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 199.
49. For example, the claim that a particular gene "predicts colon cancer with almost cruel
certainty" is probably misleading. Jonathan Bor, Gene Causing Colon Cancer Found: Discovery
at Hopkins Expected to Save Thousands of Lives, BALT. SuN, May 6, 1993, at Al.
50. White House Seeks a Ban on 'Unfair' Genetic Bias, WASH. POST, June 24, 2001, at AS,
available at 2001 WL 23176332 (quoting President Bush). The article's title and text are
misleading because the President merely voiced support for an existing bill, discussed below in
Part III.E, rather than proposing legislation. !d. A more accurate appraisal is David E. Sanger,
Bush Supports Federal Law Putting Limits on DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2001, at A10.
51. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY, supra
note 35, at 59-119.
52. Id. at 45 (suggesting that the aims of predictive genetic testing include managing
disease progression and providing reproductive options).
53. Hemochromatosis is an inherited metabolic disorder characterized by the
overabsorption of iron. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 801.
54. Wilson's disease is an autosomal recessively inherited disorder affecting copper
metabolism. See id. at 522.
55. For example, hemochromatosis is normally treated through venesection therapy. See
generally Pierre Brissot et a!., Clinical Aspects of Hemochromatosis, 23 TRANSFUSION SCI. 193
(2000).
56. See Satz & Silvers, Disability and Biotechnology, supra note 46, at 173.
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Further, when an individual's family medical 'history
demonstrates a propensity toward a particular type of disease, a
negative test result may enable that individual to avoid
discriminatory treatment.5 7 Likewise, if ergonomic,ss environmental, 59
or other conditions at a work site are likely to bring on pathologies
that may have a genetic component, such as beryliosis or carpal
tunnel injury, 60 a negative test result may mitigate concern and match
individuals in the workforce with jobs they can handle safely. The
individual who tests negative may be able to plan a career or expect to
have offspring. Learning that one is not genetically disposed to a
prevalent familial disease may allow otherwise unavailable
opportunities. Individuals who fear themselves to be at high risk of
pathology may refrain from pursuing these opportunities, or society
may deny them to people believed to be at risk. Proof that they are not
at risk will reassure them of their ability to succeed in endeavors
aversive for people who develop the disease.

C. Potential Costs of Predictive Testing
Concurrent with the benefits to public health described above,
predictive genetic testing also has tremendous potential to precipitate
discriminatory treatment in employment-related opportunities and
benefits. An example of this potential for harm, and one to which we
will return below when assessing the applicability of the ADA to
genetic discrimination, 61 is a case settled early last year: EEOC u.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad. 62 Claimants in Burlington
Northern, through their EEOC attorneys, alleged genetic
discrimination as the result of the railroad's national policy of

57. For example, family screening-mostly focused on siblings-is considered medically
imperative based on incidence of hemochromatosis. See Brissot, supra note 55, at 197·99.
58. "Ergonomic" refers to the impact upon human physiology caused by the manner in
which given employment is physically structured. For a general treatment, see T.S. CLARK &
E.N. CORLE'IT, THE ERGONOMICS OF WORKSPACES AND MACHINES: A DESIGN MANUAL (2d ed.
1995).
59. An obvious example of an environmentally induced condition is pneumoconiosis, which,
when expressed as "Black Lung Disease," is frequently attributable to the inhalation of coal dust
by miners. See Fact Sheet: Occupational Lung Disease, STATE OF THE AIR (American Lung Ass'n),
Sept. 2000, at http://www.lungusa.org/diseases/occuptional_factsheet.html.
60. See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS AND
WORKPLACE FACTORS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF EPIDEMIOLOGIC EVIDENCE FOR WORK-RELATED
MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS OF THE NECK, UPPER EXTREMITY, AND LOW BACK ch.5 (1997),
available at http://www .cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/97 -141. pdf.
61. See infra Part III.B-D.
62. No. C01-4013 (N.D. Iowa) (flied Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Burlington Northern
Complaint] (on file with authors).
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requiring union members claiming to suffer from CTS to submit to
DNA tests to determine whether those workers were predisposed to
carpal tunnel injuries. 63
According to Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the Human
Genome Project, possibly one in ten thousand individuals may have
such a genetic disposition. 64 In processing claims for compensation by
workers who had undergone surgery for CTS, Burlington Northern
required the individuals to submit to blood tests without obtaining
consent for their use in genetic testing. 65 At least one worker claimed
he was threatened with discharge for not permitting the blood to be
drawn. 66 Because no federal law specifically prohibited a private
employer from genetically discriminating against its workers, the
EEOC formulated its charges based upon an expansive reading of the
ADA that had been previously encoded in its enforcement guidelines
but never directly tested in court. 67 After a flurry of publicity that
characterized Burlington Northern as having opened the door to
victimizing citizens on the basis of their genetic heritage, 68 defendants
settled their claims prior to trial, with the elimination of future
genetic testing as part of the remedy. 69
Regardless of its outcome, this case serves as a beacon
illuminating a troubling future. 70 It warns people that they may have
to absorb liability for injuries to themselves, if whoever has
precipitated those injuries can show that they are less than normally
Id.
See CBS News: 60 Minutes II, Should Your Boss Know Your Genetic Predispositions,
(CBS television broadcast, Apr. 10, 2001).
65. This requirement extended both to instances of worker compensation claims, as well as
to cases of alleged work-related carpal tunnel injuries. See Burlington Northern Complaint,
supra note 62. Descriptions of the case and its disposition exist in a number of contexts, with
one of the more accurate accounts being the EEOC's press release. Press Release, U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Settles ADA Suit Against BNSF Genetic Bias (Apr.
18, 2001), at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-18-0l.html [hereinafter EEOC Burlington Northern
Press Release]; see also Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 GENETICS
MED. 165 (2001), reprinted in 3 AAPD NEWS 8 (2001) (both on file with authors) (providing
description by an EEOC Commissioner).
66. See Burlington Northern Complaint, supra note 62.
67. See discussion infra Part III.B-D.
68. Beyond national print journalism coverage, a Web search conducted in July 2001
reveals at least 842 results, many of which follow this characterization.
69. See EEOC Burlington Northern Press Release, supra note 65. Other concessions
included the company's agreement to neither analyze or utilize previously collected genetic
materials, to refrain from retaliation against employees who had opposed their policy, and to
lobby on behalf of pending federal legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination. I d.
70. We discuss the opposite result in EEOC u. Woodbridge Corp., where a district court
granted summary judgment to defendants based upon the plaintiffs' failure to satisfy the ADA's
"regarded as" criteria for coverage within the context of genetic testing. 124 F. Supp. 2d 1132,
1138-39 (W.D. Mo. 2000); see also 19 NAT'L DISABILITY L. REP. 114 (2000); see infra Part Ill. D.
63.
64.
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resistant to being injured. The creation of a category of asymptomatic
people classified as genetically flawed, who are for that reason left
unprotected against the denial of employment opportunities,
compensation, and benefits, invites defensive strategies ~against
assignment to this class. The first obvious line of defense is to evade
genetic testing. If people adopt this strategy, as they are likely to do,
they will impede the realization of genomics' contributions to both
personal welfare and social good. Not only will they relinquish welltargeted prophylactic and therapeutic intervention for themselves,
they also will obstruct others from obtaining knowledge about their
own genes by refusing to participate in procedures that involve family
participation (such as the test for Huntington's disease)7 1 or in
research that requires human-subject participation by individuals
with certain familial histories (such as research on genetic
dispositions to breast cancer or Alzheimer's disease). 72
Fear of discrimination thus has the potential to block benefits
that otherwise might be gained from genomic knowledge. But how
much reality is there in these fears? Undoubtedly, some people are
subjected to disadvantageous treatment because they likely have or
will develop a genetically based illness or disability. For example, a
recent survey by the Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center discovered
nearly six hundred cases where, based on beliefs about their
predispositions to genetic diseases, individuals lost employment
opportunities. 73 In a well-known case in Australia, a young man whose
mother had died of Huntington's disease was denied employment in
the public sector, in the career for which he had been educated, unless
he agreed to a genetic test and the test results were negative. 74 Many
other examples can be amassed. 75 Nevertheless, the current extent of
genetic discrimination in employment is not known, especially if we
restrict the evidence of it to reported legal decisions in which results of

71. See generally Marleen Decruyenaere et al., Non-Participation in Predictive Testing for
Huntington Disease: Individual Decision-Making, Personality and Avoidant Behaviour in the
Family, 5 EUR. J. HUMAN GENETICS 351 (1997).
72. See generally Katrina Armstrong, Genetic Susceptibility to Breast Cancer: From the Roll
of the Dice to the Hand Women Were Dealt, 285 JAMA 2907, 2907-09 (2001); SERGE GAUTHIER,
CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT OF ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE (2d ed. 2000).
73. See Julian Borger, Health Warning as DNA Screening Takes Hold, Americans Find it
Can Leave Them Unemployed and Uninsured: Who's Testing our Genes-and Why?, GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 19, 2000, at 15. These cases also involved the loss of insurance benefits. Id. The
Shriver Center, which is a division of the University of Massachusetts Medical School, conducts
both biobehaviorial and biomedical research and is available online at http://www.shriver.org.
74. See Sandy Taylor, A Case Study of Genetic Discrimination: Social Work and Advocacy
Within a New Context, AUSTL. Soc. WORK, Dec. 1998, at 52.
75. See Borger, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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genetic tests, rather than existing symptoms or family histories, play
the decisive role. 76
The Council for Responsible Genetics has two hundred
allegations of genetic discrimination by employers on file. 77 Variations
in these cases illustrate how different kinds of information about an
individual's genetic condition may play a role. For example, a social
worker was dismissed a week after mentioning that her mother had
died of Huntington's disease. 78 The worker in another case
participated in a research project and tested positive for a mutation of
the BRCA1 gene, a mutation that correlates with breast and ovarian
cancer in young women. 79 She opted for prophylactic surgery, which
appreciably lowered her risk by removing breasts, uterus, and ovaries,
the sites of vulnerable tissue.so Nevertheless, she subsequently lost
her job. 81 Although both cases involve heritable diseases, the former
turns on know ledge of familial history and the second on know ledge of
molecular medicine. Are they sufficiently similar to qualify as genetic
discrimination? We need to clarify whether the target for statutory
protection against genetic discrimination includes all individuals at
risk for inheritable pathological conditions or just those whose
conditions are discovered through predictive genetic testing. We will
argue below that, due to the enormous social cost of permitting a large
group of individuals to be stripped of labor market productivity,
statutory protection against genetic discrimination ought to be very
broad. 82

II.

THE PRIVACY MODEL AND ITS LIMITATIONS

In the main, two lines of thought about the grounds for
protection against genetic discrimination have been pursued. Initially,
the appeal was to citizens' privacy rights. More recently,
antidiscrimination safeguards have been invoked. This part analyzes
the privacy model and examines some of its limitations.

76. See Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the
Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CAREL. & POL'y 225, 234 n. 79 (2000).
77. See Borger, supra note 73, at 15.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See infra Part IV.
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A. The Privacy Model

Several areas of U.S. law address privacy rights. One is
constitutional law, especially applications of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. 83 Here the emphasis is on preserving
individuals' control over that intimate information that affects the
core of personal identity. The social and legal space individuals need
to develop the emotional, cognitive, and spiritual dimensions essential
to autonomous beings is the domain cloaked by the right to privacy.
Thus, for example, citizens have the right to affiliate with marriage
partners regardless of whether their choice threatens the stability of
prevailing social convention, 84 to engage in unregulated sexual
practice with a marriage partner, 85 and to avoid becoming a parent. 86
Whether citizens have the concomitant right to decide to become
parents with no intrusion by the state is more problematic. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, a case in which the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a state statute decreeing the sterilization of threetime convicted offenders, is usually cited in support of the claim to this
right. 87 There, however, the Court analyzed Skinner as an equal
protection case and threw out Oklahoma's statute because the
legislative record offered no evidence for preventing thieves'
reproduction but not that of embezzlers. 88 As the concurring Justices
pointed out, however, the Skinner decision did not preclude states
from interfering with individuals' reproductive freedom so long as
legislatures either construe their socially undesirable characteristics
as heritable or associate heritable undesirable characteristics with the
individual's class. 89 In the latter instance, individuals might be subject
to sterilization based on no more than a showing of their membership
in a class with a greater than species-typical probability of
transmitting socially undesirable characteristics. 90

83. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, XIV.
84. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (overturning Virginia's miscegenation
statute).
85. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's sodomy
restriction, while approving similar conduct within the houndaries of heterosexual marriage).
86. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (granting access to
contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding right to the abortion procedure).
87. 316 u.s. 535 (1942).
88. Id. at 538-39.
89. Id. at 544-45.
90. Id.
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Tort law also offers individuals some privacy protection. 91 In
general, citizens may not intrude upon each other's private affairs by
disclosing misleading or embarrassing personal facts, especially those
constitutive of personal identity. 92 Such personal information is
conceived to have been wrongly appropriated if disclosed for
advantage or profit without the person's consent. 93 Here, however,
statute and precedent present a complex picture about the ways that
various personal facts may or may not be constitutive of personal
identity, as well as the conditions under which consent to disclosure
may be required or presumed.
Evidentiary privileges, contract and property law, and federal
and state statutes also protect privacy rights. 94 Medical patients'
privacy is covered by a patchwork of federal and state provisions,
including the accrediting standards for hospitals. 95 The Privacy Act of
1974 limits federal agencies' uses of information to those that are
"relevant and necessary" for their authorized mandates, permits
individuals to access their own records and to request emendations,
and proscribes the disclosure of information to third parties. 96 Another
example, the 1996 New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act, makes genetic
information the patient's private property (regardless of who has paid
for the genetic tests) and requires informed consent to any disclosure
of test results. 97 Employment discrimination is addressed in these
statutes, but it is addressed through a privacy approach. Specifically,
employers cannot fail to hire an individual based on the applicant's
refusal to submit to genetic tests because those who insist on the
privacy of their genetic information cannot be penalized thereby. 98
Even where not explicitly banned, intrusions into the privacy of
an individual's biological condition may be deflected by other
protections. The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Norman-Bloodsaw v.
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory examined the issue of disparate
91. Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 40 (Mark A. Rothstein ed.,
1997).
92. Id.
93. See id; see also June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New Tort?, 34
CREIGHTON L. REV. 965, 982·83 (2001).
94. See generally JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF·GOVERNMENT (2001) (discussing the panoply offactors relevant to privacy law).
95. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE (4th ed. 2001).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
97. N.J. REV. STAT.§ 178:30-12 (1996).
98. Id. A few other states have passed similar provisions. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
10-3-ll04.7(1)(a) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2002); GA.
CODE ANN.§ 33-54-1(1) (Harrison 1996).
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treatment with respect to an employer's invasions of privacy. 99 In
Norman-Bloodsaw, the employer required employees to provide blood
samples and submitted the samples to panels of tests. 100 People of
color were tested for syphilis (as was only one Caucasian employee,
who happened to be married to an Mrican-American woman).1° 1 They
were retested for syphilis (not a genetic test) regularly.l 02 MricanAmericans were recurrently examined for the sickle-cell gene, despite
a single test's sufficiency to identify the presence of the gene. 103 The
employer claimed that blood-testing policies were designed to promote
the good health of employees. The employer also represented that the
tests were simply part of an overall health benefits program that
administered EKGs more regularly to men in the age group at high
risk for heart disease than to other employees. 104 Employees testified
that they received no beneficial information; individuals who knew,
from other sources, that they were sickle-cell carriers were never so
informed as a result of Lawrence's testing program.l 05
The
Norman-Bloodsaw
court
rebuked
laboratory
106
administrators for two related failures.
First, although notification
of the tests that might be run on samples was posted on a wall, the
court did not agree that such notification met the standard of
disclosure required for informed consent. 107 Second, people of colorespecially Mrican-Americans-suffered from a more egregious pattern
of testing without their consent than did Caucasian employees. 108

B. Limitations of the Privacy Model
On the privacy model, a person's. genetic information is her
property and, consequently, should be under her control. Relatively
little litigation has been pursued under genetic privacy statutes.
99. 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998).
100. Id. at 1265.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1265 n.5.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1265. In dicta, the court stated further that:
This is not to say that a Title VII action would necessarily lie in a case involving two
different but equivalent tests administered to men and women. Thus, for example, if
test were given to men for testicular cancer and to women for ovarian cancer, there
would probably be no cause of action under Title VII. In the case of a pregnancy test
for women, however, it is doubtful that an equivalent test could be offered to men.

Id. at 1272 n.20.
105. Id. at 1266.
106. Id. at 1267, 1272.
107. ld. at 1267 n.7.
108. Id. at 1272.
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Nevertheless, we can identify some issues that are likely to divide the
courts.
Given the nonmaterial nature of the possessed object, several
difficulties about its control arise. First, whose responsibility is it to
identify or safeguard sensitive and easily portable genetic
information? 109 In many businesses, individuals who administer
health care benefits or manage health and safety programs also have
responsibility for some aspects of personnel management. 110 In these
circumstances, is it feasible to expect employers to maintain a firewall
between health care records that may reveal employees' genetic
conditions and information used in personnel decisions? Second, when
a proprietor waives a privacy right for one purpose, is the information
no longer protected from use for other purposes? Third, where more
than one person has a property right in certain information, how are
their interests prioritized with respect to maintaining control? Finally,
do circumstances in which lack of access to the information threatens
public safety, places commercial interests at considerable
disadvantage, or deprives the subject of significant benefits, override
privacy protections? All these questions have elicited complex and
sometimes contradictory answers in litigation over privacy and
property rights.lll The nature of genetic information promises even
further complications.ll 2
Genetic information about an individual is discovered in
several different ways. As in the cases referred to above, a chance
remark about family history or response to a formal disclosure
requirement may reveal significant data. 11 3 Data often are
accumulated in a medical setting, where informed consent is in
principle necessary.11 4 In practice, however, patients often are asked
to consent only to contributing a specimen or sample or to the use of
their body materials for certain panels of tests (as in Burlington

109. See generally Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information
in the Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75 (1991); Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and
Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 281 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
liO. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HUMAN RESOURCES HANDBOOK, available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos02l.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
111. See Rothstein, supra note 109, at 285.
112. While biotechnology companies vie for exclusive rights to genetic information-even to
the extent of licensing the genetic information of entire population groups-one commentator has
asserted that the intellectual property rights in genetic data are insufficient to "warrant the cost
of enforcement by those affected." See Michael S. Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 653, 653 (1998).
113. See supra Part II.A.
114. See JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE 222-34 (2d ed. 1996).

2002]

AN EQUALITY PARADIGM

1357

Northern), 11 5 or they are informed of the tests to be run without
specifying what is learned from the tests (as in Norman-Bloodsaw).l 16
The physician may order the panel for one reason, which she discusses
with the patient, but the entire set of test results becomes part of the
patient's record.l 17 In all of these cases, does the patient's consent to
be tested imply consent to treat all results of the test as ordinary
medical records that are available, under the usual conditions, to
employers? Or does genetic privacy assign genetic information an
especially secure status?
A different version of the aforementioned problem is created by
the rapid expansion of genomic knowledge. A genetic anomaly that is
correlated with one condition may, in the future, be correlated with
another, or anomalies may cluster so that the presence of one suggests
the presence of another.1 18 To illustrate, individuals who provided
DNA to be tested for susceptibility to heart disease could, years later,
find that their physicians have recommended suspension of their
drivers' licenses because of new data that the gene has one hundred
percent penetrance for a very early onset variation of Alzheimer's
disease. Does their earlier consent to the collection of information
regarding heart disease entail similar acquiescence to whatever can be
further learned from the genetic material they agreed to have tested?
Unlike some other kinds of possessions, genetic information is
often the property of more than one individual at the same time.
Genetic makeup is shared among close biological relatives, so test
results for one person can yield information about another person.l 19
Some tests, such as that for Huntington's disease, require samples
from biological relatives of the patient to isolate genetic markers. 120 In
such cases, should we defer to the individual who will benefit from
disclosure or to the one who wishes to preserve privacy? The
individual-consent mechanism ill fits a technology that is based on the
relational nature of genetic information.1 21
Finally, are there considerations that warrant overriding
privacy? Several state genetic privacy statutes prohibit employers
from requiring genetic testing during the hiring process but permit it

115. See discussion supra Part I. C.
116. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
117. See .AlmEN, supra note 114, at 222-34.
118. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
119. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Iceland's Plan for Genomics Research: Facts and
Implications, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 155-57 (2000).
120. See generally Decruyenaere, supra note 71.
121. See Anita Silvers, Primary Care Physicians and the Duty to Inform About Genetic
Discrimination, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS (forthcoming Summer 2001).
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subsequently for occupational safety reasons. 122 In cases in which
patients' health conditions endanger others (for instance, where an
individual fails to manage her infectious tuberculosis or has a
psychiatric condition that makes her a danger to others), courts
typically have held that public safety trumps individual rights.l 23
What complicates these judgments in the case of genetically
occasioned conditions is the looseness of the connection between
testing positive for a gene or marker and becoming symptomatic of the
correlated disease.l 24 How much evidence of correlation between a
gene and disease symptoms must there be, and to what degree must a
disease gene be expressed, to warrant curtailing the opportunities of
individuals who have inherited it? Is Huntington's disease, which we
believe to have one hundred percent penetrance, the paradigm? 125 We
know that individuals whose relatives developed certain forms of
senile dementia are at higher risk of suffering it themselves than
individuals with no family history at all. 126 Yet rarely, if ever, do
employers demand such family histories or limit the employment of
higher risk family members. Does public safety warrant them doing so
if genetic testing rather than family history is involved?
Business necessity, which often constitutes an employer's
defense against unfavorable treatment of an employee or customer, is
also problematic where access to genetic information is concerned.
Should necessity be demonstrated prior to obtaining access to
information, or only subsequent to acting on it? What counts as a
necessity? Should employers be permitted to require employees who
file for workers' compensation to undergo genetic testing only if a
122. Examples of states adhering to this dual approach include Iowa, New Hampshire, New
York, and Wisconsin. Compare IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.6.2 (West 1993) with§ 729.6.7; compare
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 141-H:31(a) (1996) with § 141-H:3V; compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
296.19(a)(1) (McKinney 2001) with § 296.19(c); compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.372(1)(a) (West
1997) with§ 111.372(4).
123. The defense originated in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987),
a case brought under the Rehabilitation Act by a school teacher with tuherculosis. In Arline, the
Court held that although an individual with a contagious disease could in fact be excluded from
employment while her condition posed a public health danger, she could not be so deprived when
that danger abated. Id. at 287 n.16. We revisit this concept when describing the ADA defense of
direct threat. See infra Part III. C.
124. This question and the ones that follow are discussed in greater detail below in Part

N.B.
125. In a recent interview on National Public Radio, Karen Wolff, a genetic counselor at the
Harvey Institute of Human Genetics in Baltimore,. used Huntington's disease as "the best
example in the world of genetics" of a predictable but incurable disease. See All Things
Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 13, 2002).
126. The media have focused extensively on the genetic basis for Alzheimer's disease. See,
e.g., Arthur Allen, Memory Lapse-or Alzheimer's?, WASH. POST, May 8, 2001, at T10 (discussing
a study of the link between family history and the onset of Alzheimer's disease).
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contributing genetic condition is relatively prevalent, so that a good
deal of money could be saved by declaring it a preexisting or
contributory condition? Or may business necessity warrant testing
even where savings would be negligible because the genetic conditions
are extremely rare?

III.

ANTIDISCRIMINATION MODELS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

As the realities of collecting and protecting genetic information
have become clear, enthusiasm for basing protection on privacy rights
has waned. Attention has turned to the antidiscrimination model that
is already instantiated in federal and state genetic discrimination and
disability discrimination law. In this part we describe the
antidiscrimination model and explain some of the problems that arise,
in both practice and theory, from its application to genetic
discrimination
In the United States, discussion has centered on the EEOC's
application of the ADA to genetic discrimination.l 27 In the United
Kingdom and Australia, debate has centered on extending these
nations' respective Disability Discrimination Acts. 128 At issue in all
these discussions is whether it is appropriate and necessary to develop
separate protection for individuals with genetic anomalies. Where the
privacy model extends protection by sequestering information, the
antidiscrimination model assumes that such attempts may be
unsuccessful and consequently regulates the uses to which genetic
information may be put.
A. The Genetie Discrimination Model

Although current state laws lean heavily on precedents of
privacy, antidiscrimination provisions have been sprinkled among
them. For example, the first state to enact a genetic discrimination
law, North Carolina, prohibited employment discrimination based on

127. While we address this development in depth, the seminal articles by EEOC
Commissioner Miller bear noting. See Miller, supra note 65; Miller, supra note 76.
128. Both the U.K. and Australia have Disability Discrimination Acts; although different in
many respects, neither is a civil rights law. For critical overviews, see Mairian Corker, The U.K.

Disability Discrimination Act: Disabling Language, Justifying Inequitable Social Participation,
in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS 357 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000); Melinda Jones & Lee
Ann Basser Marks, A Bright New Era of Equality, Independence and Freedom: Casting an
Australian Gaze on the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE
LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra, at 371.
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the sickle-cell trait.l 29 New Jersey's genetic privacy law prohibits
certain kinds of decisions from being made about an individual
because the person is genetically disposed to develop specified
diseases. 130
Effective federal regulation specifically protecting individuals
from genetic discrimination is almost nonexistent. A single, narrowly
tailored executive order has barred federal agencies from
discriminating in employment on the basis of "genetic information"
since February 2000. 131 While the substance of this directive is
laudable, it must be noted that the number of federal employees pales
in comparison to the combined number of employees in the state and
private sectors, where protection is most needed. 132 Further, these
regulations do not address the perception that protection from genetic
discrimination is a matter for civil rights because unfavorable
treatment should no more be based on people's genes than on their
genitalia or pigmentation.133

B. The Disability Discrimination Model
In addition to measures specifically directed against genetic
discrimination, there also exists the potential for application of civil
rights legislation-namely the ADA and, more tangentially, Title
VII 134-against such harms. This approach, as seen above in the
discussion of Burlington Northern, 135 has been championed by the
EEOC with some early success.l 36 Statements, congressional

129. In amended form, the statute now also covers people with hemoglobin C traits, which
are related. See N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 95-28.1 (2001).
130. See 1996 New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act, N.J. REV. STAT. § 17B:30-12(e)-(f) (Supp.
2002).
131. See Executive Order, supra note 10. The promulgation's formal title is "To Prohibit
Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic Information." Id.
132. According to the United States Office of Personnel Management, the federal
government employed approximately 2, 708,100 civilian employees in the year 2000. U.S. OFFICE
OF PERS. MGMT., THE FACT BOOK: FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE STATISTICS 8 (2001), available
at http://www.opm.gov/feddata!Olfactbk.pdf. In December 2001, the U.S. Department of Labor
reported 109,768,000 private sector employees and 21,122,000 total government employees
(including both federal and state employees). BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS DATA, BLS Program
and Survey Special Notices, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-binlsrgate, Series ID
EE500500001 & EES90000001 (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
133. Fawn H. Johnson, Discrimination: Jeffords Examining Need for Legislation on Genetic
Discrimination; Coalitions Forming, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at C-1 (March 12, 2001).
134. Such legislation may apply when "a significant correlation to race, national origin,
religion, or gender" exists with the particular genetic discrimination, as, for example, sickle-cell
disease, which disproportionately impacts Mrican-Americans. Miller, supra note 76, at 247.
135. See supra Part I. C.
136. Id.
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testimony, and scholarship by EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven
Miller indicate that the agency will continue to pursue this line of
legal argument.137
Federal courts have required individuals who hope to be
safeguarded by the ADA to prove that they have disabilities. Being
disabled means having "(a) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as
having such an impairment." 138 The ADA does not specify application
to genetic conditions. There are, however, several reasons for thinking
that it may be applicable, at least to some extent. 139
First, the congressional record offers some evidence of
legislative intent. Congressman Major Owens stated that
[t]hese protections of the ADA will also benefit individuals who are identified through
genetic tests as being carriers of a disease-associated gene ... Under the ADA, such
individuals may not be discriminated against simply because they may not be qualified
for a job sometime in the future. The determination as to whether an individual is
qualified ... may not be based on speculation regarding the future. 140

Other Congressmen echoed these expectations about the scope of the
ADA. 141 In sum, Congressmen characterized genetic discrimination as
exhibiting the myths, fears, and stereotypes that historically have
prevented people perceived as biologically anomalous from enjoying
fair equality of opportunity.l42
Second, the ADA clearly protects individuals with inherited
impairments such as muscular dystrophy, retinitis pigmentosa,
osteogenesis imperfecta, achondroplasia, Williams syndrome, and
schizophrenia. 143 Regardless of the degree to which they are
symptomatic, individuals with these genes clearly have the inherited
conditions. Some conditions encompass a range of limitations. For
instance, the skills of people with Williams syndrome vary from

137. See Part III.B.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2000).
139. See infra Part III. C.
140. 136 CONG. REC. H4614-02 (1990), available at 1990 WL 97270.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Bultmeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that paranoid schizophrenia is a covered disability under the ADA); Johnson v. Equicom, Inc.,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18032, *10-11 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff with retinitis
pigmentosa had a disability but failed to demonstrate that he was discharged because of his
disability); EEOC v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 993 F. Supp. 726, 728-29 (D. Ariz. 1998) (addressing
muscular dystrophy); Duprey v. Conn. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 28 F. Supp. 2d 702, 703 (D. Conn.
1998) (finding that plaintiff with osteogenesis imperfecta was "limited in the major life activity of
walking'').
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individual to individual. 144 Almost all are exceptionally good at music
and bad at math. 145 Some are so seriously limited intellectually as to
be classified as mentally retarded, while others attain college and
postgraduate degrees. 146 A state that proposed to sterilize all its
citizens with Williams syndrome (as some states did in the past)1 47
very likely would be charged with disability discrimination under the
ADA. In that event, it would be exceedingly disturbing if a court ruled
that the ADA protected only the people with Williams syndrome
whose condition limits them from finishing elementary or high school,
leaving the individuals with Williams syndrome who have finished
college with no defense against being sterilized.
Some of the genetic conditions referenced above-for instance,
muscular dystrophy and retinitis pigmentosa-are progressive. 148
Individuals who test positive for these genes may be asymptomatic at
the time yet face substantial limitation in the future. Whether such
individuals are protected while they are asymptomatic remains
unclear.l 49 Suppose an employer believes, mistakenly, that visually
impaired individuals cannot perform a particular job. It would be
disquieting if the employer were prohibited from excluding, on the
basis of genetic information about the employee's retinitis, an
individual who had already lost his sight due to retinitis but could
exclude from employment qualified individuals with the retinitis gene
who could see perfectly well.
Third, citing the congressional record, the EEOC has offered
guidance that brings actions arising from genetic information relating
to genetic disease or disabling conditions under the regulation of the
ADA's "regarded as" criteria. Initially, in March 1995, the EEOC
issued an ADA Compliance Manual guideline that instructed that the
"regarded as" part of the definition of "disability" "applies to
individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic
information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders." 150 Two
subsequent policy and enforcement guidance statements reiterate this
144. See generally Howard M. Lenhoff et a!., Williams Syndrome and the Brain, SCI. AM.,
Dec. 1997, at 68.
145. Id.
146. See generally Satz & Silvers, supra note 46.
147. A comprehensive treatment of this topic is provided in Robert L. Burgdorf & Marcia
Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped
Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995 (1977).
148. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 558, 1560.
149. See MICHAEL FAILLACE, DISABILITY LAW DESKBOOK: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT IN THE WORKPLACE 2-13 (2000).
150. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §
902.8 (2000). The "regarded as" prong is analyzed in greater detail below in Part III.D.
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position. The first, issued on July 26, 2000 (on the ADA's tenth
anniversary), reiterated the previous position that discrimination
against individuals with disabilities falls under the "regarded as"
prong of the ADA pursuant to the EEOC's enforcement of the
executive order.l 51 The second, issued a day later, specifically states
that blood tests to detect genetic markers or diseases are medical
examinations within the ADA's purview.1 52 These pronouncements
have been followed in EEOC opinion letters. 153 In sum, the EEOC's
position as explained by Commissioner Miller is that:
[a] person is "reg~rded as" disabled within the meaning of the ADA, if a covered entity
mistakenly believes an individual has a substantially limiting impairment, when in fact,
the impairment is not so limiting. Under such a theory, coverage for individuals with a
genetic predisposition would generally rely on demonstrating a mistaken belief
concerning the major life activity of working. 154

Although presymptomatic people may reject the idea that they
should be assigned to the disability classification, disability
discrimination has been practiced against certain groups of
presymptomatic people. Moreover, the "logic" of disability
discrimination invites this practice. Therefore, the group of
presymptomatic people who are vulnerable to disability discrimination
could expand enormously as predictive genetic testing becomes more
widespread.
A number of legal commentators strongly support application
of the ADA to the realm of genetic discrimination precisely on this
ground.1 55 To date, however, only a handful of cases clearly charging
genetic discrimination have been filed by the EEOC, the most
prominent (and only successful) one of which was the settlement
151. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, POLICY GUIDANCE ON EXECUTIVE
ORDER 13145: TO PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT BASED ON GENETIC
INFORMATION (July 26, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/guidance-genetic.html.
152. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON
DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE
AMERICANS
WITH
DISABILITIES
ACT
(ADA),
(July
27,
2000),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.
153. See, e.g., Letter re: Genetic Discrimination, 7 NAT'L. DISABILITY L. REP. 362 (1995).
154. Miller, supra note 76, at 246. Although the article was written in his personal capacity,
see id. at 225 n.*, his view of the agency's position has also been reiterated in statements made
in his authorized capacity. See EEOC Settles ADA Suit Against BNSF for Genetic Bias, EEOC
NEWS RELEASE (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n) Apr. 18, 2001. For example,
Miller has stated that the EEOC "will continue to respond aggressively to any evidence that
employers" misuse genetic information. Id.; Report Letter, EEOC Compliance Manual Report
No. 157 (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n) April 27, 2001, available at
http://www.hr.cch.com/primesrc/bin/higbwire.dll; see also Prepared Statement of Paul Steven
Miller, Commissioner U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Before the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 20, 2000.
155. See sources cited supra note 25.

1364

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1341

discussed above, in Burlington Northern. 156 A second suit alleging
genetic discrimination on the ground of adverse employment decisions
grounded in predisposition to carpal tunnel injury, EEOC v.
Woodbridge Corp., 157 was dismissed at the summary judgment
stage. 158 A claim by Terri Sergeant, a woman allegedly dismissed by
her employer after she was identified as a carrier of the Alpha-1 gene,
which can express itself as a progressive lung disorder, has received a
permission-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 159
The ADA appears to have potential for protecting against
genetic discrimination in employment. 160 Dr. Francis Collins, director
of the Human Genome Project, has remarked that "it is estimated that
all of us carry dozens of glitches in our DNA .... As a nation, we have
stated unequivocally'' in the ADA "that one's ability to do a job should
be judged on just that-the ability to do the job." 16 1 Collins has
testified that citizens are already declining to serve as subjects in
genetic research out of fear that they could be denied a job or a
promotion based simply on their participation.1 62 Clearly Congress
intended to protect citizens who are discriminated against here and
now because other people may fear the future effects of the disease for
which they are at high risk, but the propriety and effectiveness of
doing so by calling these citizens "disabled" is questionable.

C. Limitations of the Disability Discrimination Model
Courts have interpreted the ADA so as to limit the number of
people who fall under its protection. In Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., one of the Supreme Court's reasons for refusing protection to
plaintiffs rejected from employment on the basis of their myopia was
that the number of disabled people in the country would far exceed

156. See supra Part II. C.
157. 263 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2001); 19 NAT'L. DISABILITY L. REP. 114 (2000).
158. 263 F.3d at 813. The rationale offered by the court is discussed below in Part III.D.
159. See Alpha-1 Association, Update on Terri Sergeant's Genetic Discrimination Case, at
http://web.archive.org/web/20010208195556/www.alpha1.org/newsmakers/index.htm (last visited
Aug. 21, 2002) (Sergeant's story was first covered by Scientific American following her testimony
before the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pension Committee.). See also National
Partnership for Women & Families, Genetic Discrimination is a Real Problem, With Real
Victims, at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/content.cfm?L1=5&L2=2.0&L3=2 (last visited
Aug. 21, 2002).
160. The difficulties are discussed infra Part N.C.
161. See Genetic Information in the Workplace: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. (2000) (relaying prepared testimony of Francis S.
Collins, M.D., Ph.D., Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute).
162. See id.
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Congress's projections if myopics were included.l 63 Nonetheless, in
Bragdon u. Abbott, the Supreme Court agreed in principle that
asymptomatic individuals might merit disability protection. 164 The
Bragdon decision can be interpreted as suggesting that this conclusion
holds only when, despite being asymptomatic, the individual
nevertheless is limited in respect to major life activities.l 65 Were the
Bragdon precedent to be taken literally, individuals whose
Huntington's disease has not yet manifested would be protected
against employment discrimination if they refrained from major life
activities such as reproducing, but not otherwise. In addition, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's Bragdon dissent that "[r]espondent's argument,
taken to its logical extreme, would render every individual with a
genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and now
because of some possible future effects" 166 has met with approbation in
some of the lower courts.l 67 Last, in both Albertson's, Inc. u.
Kirkingburg and Sutton, the Supreme Court gave clear warning that
the deference traditionally granted to federal regulatory agencies may
not be extended to the EEOC's understanding of the ADA (which by
inference includes its guidelines on genetic discrimination). 168
Notwithstanding the Court's cautionary language, it is
precisely this last theory-that a person can be disabled although
asymptomatic or presymptomatic-that has been the basis upon
which the EEOC has initiated application of the ADA to genetic
discrimination. 169 This legal application invites potential difficulties.
Among the most significant is the potential for courts to view
asymptomatic individuals as failing to satisfy criteria for protection
under the ADA, which would eliminate the legal basis of plaintiffs
argument. 170 There also are several defenses that have been successful
under the ADA and that can be raised in response to allegations of
genetic discrimination. For instance, employers could assert that
potentially disabling conditions preclude workers from fulfilling
"essential" job functions, thus disqualifying them from ADA
protection. 171 Thus, the efficacy of duplicating the EEOC's single

163. 527 U.S. at 471, 484-85. Especially on point are the opinions of Justices O'Connor and
Ginsburg. Id. at 494.
164. 524 u.s. 624, 647 (1998).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
167. See, e.g., Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1307 (11th Cir. 1999).
168. 527 U.S. 555, 563 n.lO, 569 n.l5 (1999); 527 U.S. 471, 480 (1999).
169. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 209-53 and accompanying text.
171. See FAILLACE, sup~a note 149, at 3-14 to 3-55.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1366

[Vol. 55:1341

success in applying the ADA to the private employer in Burlington
Northern is unknown. 172
Once an individual is hired, the ADA does not prevent
employers from obtaining medical information about employeesY3
Indeed, employers are obligated to make reasonable accommodations
for workers with known disabilities, and they bear some responsibility
for determining whether an individual actually requires an
accommodationY 4 To protect themselves from the charge of failing to
accommodate a worker, employers might reasonably pursue and act
upon genetic information.1 75 For example, an employer might seek to
learn whether an employee's vision problems are symptoms of a
progressive genetic disease in order to equip that employee's
workstation with business software applications compatible with the
screenreading programs that the employee eventually may need to
use. What would then prevent the same employer from passing over
the still sighted individual for training opportunities and promotions
thought to be unsuitable for a person who is blind? It would be
extremely difficult to prove that the genetic information caused the
em player's disregard. 1 76
The ADA also permits employers to limit disabled people's
opportunities if their condition prevents them from executing the
essential functions of the job, 177 because such individuals would fail to
satisfy the statutory prerequisite of being "qualified" for that
particular employment.1 78 Although the determination of which job
functions are essential in any given dispute may seem at first blush
the proper province for a jury determination as fact finder, 179 a vast
majority of courts have instead deferred to employers' assertions of
essentiality, 180 and have thus ruled as a matter of law that plaintiffs
172. See discussion supra Part II.D.
§ 12112(d) (2000).
173. 42
174. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring this interactive process).
175. See FAILLACE, supra note 149, at 4-95 to 4-102.
176. This task is difficult in any context. See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (detailing
many of the individual ways in which employment discrimination can manifest and describli!g
the difficulties involved in proving them).
177. See§ 12111(8).
178. Id.
179. Summary judgment requires that there be "no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
180. This reinforces much of Sturm's assertion of subtle discrimination in other contexts. See
Sturm, supra note 176. Professors Linda Krieger and Lauren Edelman are currently engaged in
an empirical study examining the relative weight accorded employers' stipulations as to
essentiality in the respective areas of disability, race, and sex. Linda Krieger & Lauren Edelman
(unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).

u.s.c.
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were unqualified for their positions.1 81 Accordingly, workers with
genetic vulnerabilities to materials found in the workplace or to
injuries provoked by characteristic workplace tasks seem especially
susceptible to rejection on the ground of inability to perform essential
functions.
Moreover, employers have gradually extended another existing
defense to employment opportunity exclusion under the ADA-that of
workers posing a "direct threat." 182 Traditionally, this defense
referenced workers either creating a public health risk
(paradigmatically, as food handlers) or endangering other employees
(for instance, by transmitting communicable diseases).1 83 The EEOC's
regulation refers to the health and safety of "self' as well as that of
"others." 184 Utilizing genetic and other medical information, employers
may now be authorized to treat presently or potentially disabled
employees adversely on the ground that those workers' own
disabilities directly create risks to themselves.
Until recently, a direct intercircuit conflict existed between the
Eleventh Circuit, which recognized this defense, and the Ninth
Circuit, which did not. 185 In Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., a worker
employed by various independent contractors at an oil refinery during
181. Detailed analyses are provided in Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001) and Ruth Colker, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999).
182. § 12113(b). The standard is the same as that of "significant risk" under the
Rehabilitation Act. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 468; Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 274 (1987) (issuing guidance on how
to assess risk factors).
183. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 358-59.
Some recent litigation offers clear examples. Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284
(lOth Cir. 2000) (involving a psychiatrically impaired employee in charge of explosives);
Robertson v. Neuromedical Center, 983 F. Supp. 669 (M.D. La. 1997), aff'd, 161 F.3d 292 (5th
Cir. 1998) (focusing attention on a deficient neurologist); Newman v. Chevron USA, Inc., 979 F.
Supp. 1085 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (involving an employee in position of filling trucks with gasoline who
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder).
184. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (2001). Section 1630.2 also advises that "the employer must
determine whether a reasonable accommodation would ... eliminate" this direct threat.
185. Compare Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that an
employee with epilepsy was properly dismissed from his job in a production plant because of the
employer's fear that he would come to harm if he suffered a seizure in proximity to the fastmoving and/or extremely hot machinery near which he was required to work), with Echazabal v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (limiting
the defense to posing a threat to "other individuals"). Indirect treatments, through dicta,
occurred in four other cases, wherein the courts sided with the Eleventh Circuit's view that
direct threats do include threats to one's self. See LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146
F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 1998) (involving an epileptic line cook); EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135
(1st Cir. 1997) (involving a depressed employee who worked at a group residence for severely
disabled individuals); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995) (involving an
insulin dependent diabetic bus driver).
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the previous twenty years applied directly to Chevron for a position in
the same unit. 186 Postoffer, preemployment physical examination by
Chevron's physician revealed that Echazabal's liver was secreting
higher than normal levels of certain enzymes. 1B7 As a result, Chevron
rescinded its job offer on the ground that Echazabal's liver might be
damaged by further exposure to chemicals emanating in the plant. 188
Echazabal's subsequent consultation with several doctors revealed
that he had asymptomatic hepatitis C. 189 Because none of these latter
physicians advised him to stop working in that environment,
Echazabal continued working in the plant for contractors. 190 Three
years later a similar fact pattern was repeated.l 91 Echazabal applied
to Chevron for employment, was extended a job offer contingent on
passing a medical exam, was discovered to have hepatitis Cas a result
of the examination, and had his job offer withdrawn. 192 This time,
however, Chevron did not allow Echazabal to remain employed at its
refinery.l 93 Subsequently, Echazabal brought an action against
Chevron 194 asserting, among other claims, that the defendant did not
have an affirmative defense under the ADA's direct threat provision to
deny him employment on the ground of his being a danger to
himself. 195 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Chevron, and Echazabal appealed.196
A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit held two-to-one
that the ADA's "language is dispositive" in limiting the defense to
employment decisions designed to avoid a direct threat to "other
individuals," that the EEOC's interpretation was therefore overly
expansive, and that no other interpretation was plausible. 197 In
support of the ruling, Judge Reinhardt presented numerous examples
from the ADA's legislative history. 198 Writing for the dissent, Judge

186. 226 F. 3d at 1065.
187. !d.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. !d.
191. !d.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. The action was brought in state court and subsequently removed by defendant to
federal court. !d.
195. !d.
196. Id. at 1063.
197. Id. at 1066-67. "The fact that the statute consistently defines the direct threat defense
to include only threats to others eliminates any possibility that Congress committed a drafting
error when it omitted from the defense threats to the disabled individual himself." Id.
198. Id. at 1066-72.
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Trott noted that the panel had "fortunately" created an intercircuit
conflict that "will compel the Supreme Court or Congress to resolve
this dispute." 199 The plea was prescient, as certiorari was
subsequently granted, and a decision was handed down on June 10,
2002. 200
Reversing the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, a unanimous Supreme
Court held that the EEOC regulation authorized an employer to
exclude a disabled employee whose job performance would "endanger
his own health."2° 1 The Court did not, however, expatiate the standard
employers had to meet to justify such exclusion or establish whether
Echazabal's liver condition actually posed a danger to himself. 202 The
possible, although not mandated, revisiting of both the procedural and
factual questions was left on remand to the Ninth Circuit. 203 Given the
Court's broad approbation of the defense, it seems likely that
employers will continue to assert that current or future workers ought
to be excluded from employment opportunities because their genetic
dispositions present threats to their own well-being.
The ADA also contains a partial exemption for insurance
coverage. Pursuant to a safe harbor provision in Title V, insurers may
offer coverage that adversely impacts individuals with disabilities, so
long as the differential treatment is based upon actuarially sound
evidence that these individuals pose an expensive risk and is not a
"subterfuge to evade" the ADA's antidiscrimination purpose. 204 As a
result, courts have held that employers are not required to offer any
particular coverage to disabled individuals so long as the coverage
offered is equal to that offered to nondisabled people. 205 Some courts
have interpreted the "safe harbor" provision to require proof by
disabled plaintiffs of intentional stratagems; 206 others have allowed
199. Id. at 1075 (Trott, J., dissenting).
200. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazahal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
201. Id. at 2047.
202. Id. It bears noting, however, that when describing the harms that Echazahal might
cause, Justice Souter did so only in terms of the potential costs (such as tort liability) that would
be borne by the employer and did not mention those which might harm Echazabal's own health.
Id. at 2052. We discuss the implications in a companion piece, Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley
Stein, Disability, Paternalism, and the Supreme Court (unpublished manuscript on file with
authors).
203. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f) (2001). For international
perspective, see Trudo Lemmens, Selective Justice, Genetic Discrimination, and Insurance:
Should We Single Out Genes in Our Laws?, 45 McGILLL.J. 347 (2000).
205. See, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999); Ford v.
Schering·Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3rd Cir. 1998).
206. See, e.g., Ford, 145 F.3d at 601; Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 678·79
(8th Cir. 1996).
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actuarial support to rebut allegations of discrimination, 207 a position
not inconsistent with that of the EEOC. 208

D. The ''Regarded As" Classification
Disability discrimination law has followed a trajectory targeted
at defining who shall be protected against disability discrimination
and who shall not be. 209 Seven ADA cases the Supreme Court has
heard relate, in one way or another, to this question. Bragdon
concerned whether an individual with an asymptomatic HIV infection
was protected. 210 In Sutton, 2 1l.Kirkingberg, 212 Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, 213 and Toyota v. Williams, 214 the Court addressed whether
people with certain physical limitations-severe myopia, blindness in
one eye, extremely elevated blood pressure, and repetitive stress
syndrome, respectively-are protected. In Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems, the protection of an employee who claimed
eligibility for Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") under the
ADA was concurrently protected by the ADA. 215 And in University of
Alabama v. Garrett, the protection of state employees was at issue. 216
In all but one of these cases, defendants prevailed.
Subsequently, a larger proportion of plaintiffs have proceeded under
the "regarded as" prong of the ADA. 217 Predictive genetic testing
typically is done before the individual's genetic condition becomes
symptomatic and causes substantial limitations of major life

207. See, e.g., Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D. Minn. 1998); Morgenthal
v. AT & T Co., 97 Civ. 6443 (DAB), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4294 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999).
208. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC INTERIM ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES 12 (1993).
209. In some cases, state law is more embracing than federal law. For instance, recent
amendments to California's Fair Employment and Housing legislation specify that employees be
protected without regard to the degree of substantiality of their impairments. See CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12940(e)(l), (f)(l) (West 2001).
210. 524 u.s. 624, 628 (1998).
211. 527 u.s. 471 (1999).
212. 527 u.s. 555 (1999).
213. 527 u.s. 516 (1999).
214. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
215. 526 U.S. 795, 797 (1999).
216. 276 F.3d 1227 (lith Cir. 2001).
217. Referring to this prong of the ADA via the nomenclature of "perceived as" disabled,
Michelle Travis offers comprehensive treatments. See Michelle Travis, Leveling the Playing Field
or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair Advantage" Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 901 (2000) [hereinafter Travis, Leveling the Playing Field]; Michelle Travis, Perceived
Disabilities, Social Cognition, and ''Innocent Mistakes", 55 Vand. L. Rev. 481 (2002).
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activities. 218 Therefore, we may expect that individuals who seek
remedies for protection against genetic discrimination through the
ADA often will claim that they have been treated unfavorably because
they are regarded as disabled rather than because they are
disabled.219
For example, Terri Sergeant, an individual with a family
history of Alpha-1 antitrypsin, an often fatal deterioration of the
lungs, has filed under the "regarded as" prong. 220 · When
presymptomatic, Sergeant tested positive for the genetic disposition
for this disease, which had killed her brother at age thirty-seven. 221 As
a result of the test, her physician initiated preventive therapy that
deters the development of the <:lisease and protects against lung
infection. 222 This treatment costs more than $45,000 annually but
permits her to work and engage in all other life activities without
limitations. 223 Sergeant worked for a firm that partially self-insured
for employees' health insurance. 224 During her employment, she had
repeatedly received outstanding performance evaluations and merit
salary increases. 225 In November 1999, seven months after her costly
preventive treatment began, she received another excellent review
and increase. 226 One month later, her employment was terminated. 227
Although there is no certainty that Sergeant would have
become symptomatic even without the preventive therapy, the
prophylactic measures appear to have been effective. 228 Sergeant
remains able to perform activities like walking and breathing, major
life activities that are severely compromised in symptomatic cases of
Alpha-1 antitrypsin. 229 There is no reason to believe that her
employers, who observed her daily, regarded her as currently unable
to perform these activities, for the medical information indicates that
there is no medical question about her work capability provided she
has access to expensive medical interventions. 230 The record of
218. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND ,SOCIAL POLICY, supra note
35, at 59-115.
219. Arguments in support of this assertion are set out in Miller, supra note 76, at 240-41.
220. Alpha-1, supra note 159; National Partnership, supra note 159.
221. National Partnership, supra note 159.
222. Id.
223. Alpha-1, supra note 159.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. National Partnership, supra note 159.
229. Id.
230. See id.
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litigation under the "regarded as" clause, however, is insufficiently
clear to know whether she will succeed under this theory. 231
To establish a claim of being "regarded as" disabled under the
ADA, 232 the statute requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that her
employer mistakenly believed she had a physical or mental
impairment that limited a major life activity, when she in fact had no
such impairment. 233 An example of such a mistaken belief would be an
individual who utilizes a lower leg prosthetic device to ameliorate an
amputation, but whose functional ability has not actually been
impaired. 234 Such an individual would be regarded as disabled under
the ADA if her employer nevertheless believed her to be limited in a
major life activity such as walking or standing. Congress extended the
ADA's definition of disability to this group of functionally nondisabled
individuals in order to combat erroneous but widespread cultural
assumptions about people with "disabilities"-what the EEOC
eloquently terms the "perception of disability based on myth, fear, or
stereotype." 235
The current Supreme Court addressed the "regarded as" prong
in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., a case involving myopic twins
denied employment as pilots by United Air Lines. 236 The Court
acknowledged the goals underlying the protection of individuals
misperceived as having disabilities that were articulated in Arline. 237
Nevertheless, the Sutton Court held that to be regarded as disabled
under the ADA a defendant would have to entertain stereotypical
misperceptions about a plaintiffs ability to carry out a broad range of
jobs because of the mistaken belief that a nonexistent disability
substantially limited her from performing certain major life
activities. 238 In other words, an employer has to believe that the
individual is ecumenically disabled-that she cannot perform an
entire range of jobs in addition to the one from which she claims she
has been unjustly excluded. 239 The Court's attendant decisions in
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg 240 and Murphy v. United Parcel
231. See supra Part III.B.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000).
233. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2001) (providing the EEOC interpretive guideline).
234. One well-known example is cross-country runner Terry Fox. See Michael Ashley Stein,
From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of Americans With Disabilities, 43 EMORY
L.J. 245 (1994).
235. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2001) (providing the EEOC interpretive guideline).
236. 527 u.s. 471, 475 (1999).
237. Id. at 489-90.
238. Id. at 489.
239. Id.
240. 527 u.s. 555 (1999).
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Service 241 upheld this ruling without much adumbration. Lower courts
have subsequently viewed employers' misperceptions as "innocent
mistakes," requiring that group-based animus (i.e., believing that
plaintiffs are socially incompetent in a generic sense) be ascribed to
defendants as a prerequisite to satisfying the "regarded as" criteria. 242
The single recorded federal decision to adjudicate a claim of
genetic discrimination on the merits, EEOC v. Woodbridge Corp., 243
followed the current Supreme Court's ADA rulings in granting
defendant summary judgment (despite the similarity of the case to
claims asserted by the EEOC in Burlington Northern). 244 In
Woodbridge, the EEOC brought an action on behalf of nineteen job
applicants who had successfully applied to work in Woodbridge's
polyurethane foam-producing factory. 245 As part of their postoffer,
preemployment medical examinations, the plaintiffs were subjected to
a neurometry test specially developed to screen for the existence or
"significant likelihood" of developing CTS. 246 As the result of the
plaintiffs having scored above a certain level on that test, they were
each denied employment at the defendant's factory. 247
Plaintiffs through their EEOC attorneys asserted that
applicants for other jobs in the factory-including electricians and tool
technicians who also placed stress upon their wrist joints-had not
been subjected to the test. 248 They also claimed that because of the
neurometry screening, Woodbridge regarded them as disabled and
therefore illegally discriminated against them. 249 Citing Sutton, the
district court granted summary judgment to defendant on the ground
that to prevail under the "regarded as" prong the employer must have
not only subjectively believed that the employees had a disability but
also "regard[ed] the employee as disabled as defined" under the
ADA. 250 The court ruled that Woodbridge believed that the applicants'
predisposition to CTS, although not definitively evidenced by the
neurometry screening, rendered them unqualified only for the specific
factory positions. 251 Under these circumstances, the court held that
241. 527 u.s. 516 (1999).
242. See, e.g., Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 1999); Deane v.
Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143-44 (3d Cir. 1998) (en bane).
243. 124 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (W.D. Mo. 2000), aff'd, 263 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2001).
244. ld. at 1133.
245. Id. at 1134-35.
246. ld.
247. ld. at 1135.
248. Id.
249. ld. at 1133.
250. Id. at 1136.
251. Id. at 1137.
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Woodbridge could not have regarded the nineteen applicants as
disabled in the general sense.252
Thus, whether Terri Sergeant--or any other claimant under
the ADA's "regarded as" prong-can establish that her employer
regarded her as disabled and fired her for this reason is unclear. (To
date, the EEOC has invited the parties to arbitrate their claims.) 253
The circular nature of her dilemma, however, is clear. Positive genetic
testing permits Sergeant to take preventive measures against the
substantial limitations of major life activities that could occur as a
result of her genetic condition. The success of these measures may
have left her unprotected against losing her job, however. Ironically,
people may have to forgo the medical benefits genetic information can
bring if they are to be protected by the ADA from discrimination based
on that information. This catch-22 situation, which so adversely
affects asymptomatic and presymptomatic individuals such as
Sergeant, is not addressed by either existing or proposed statutory
provisions.

E. Putative Federal Protection
A bill intended to address genetic discrimination independently
of the ADA, House Bill 602, is currently pending before Congress. 254
Cosponsored by Representative Louise Slaughter (a microbiologist), 255
the Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment
Act 256 would, in pertinent part, prohibit employment discrimination in
hiring and terms of employment on the basis of genetic information. 257
The proposed legislation addresses predictive genetic information,
acquired from the analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes,
proteins, and certain metabolites in order to detect genotypes,

252. !d.
253. Letter from U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n on Charge No. 14AA00039,
(Nov. 21, 2001) (on file with authors).
254. See H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001). The Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection held a brief hearing on July 11, 2001, at which the measure's cosponsors
and five other supporters, including Dr. Craig Venter of Celera Genomics, advocated its passage.
The Potential for Diserimination in Health Insurance Based on Predictive Genetic Tests: Hearing
Before the House Subeomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm.
on
Energy
and
Commerce,
107th
Cong.
(2001),
available
at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-46.pdf [hereinafter Subcomm. on Commerce
Hearing] (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
255. Representative Slaughter has commented that "every single human being is born with
genetic flaws. As a result, we are potentially uninsurable and potentially unemployable."
Subcomm. on Commerce Hearing, supra note 254, at 8.
256. H.R. 602, 107th Cong. § 1 (2001).
257. § 202.
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mutations, or chromosomal anomalies or from information about
genetic test results or occurrences of genetic disease in family
members. 258 It excludes data about any other aspect of an individual's
health and thus does not cover information about individuals who
already are symptomatic. 259 This legislative approach focuses on the
special nature of genetic information and invokes the theory of
"genetic exceptionalism." 26o
Under the terms of House Bill 602, employers may not use
predictive genetic information or information about requests for
genetic testing or counseling to fail to hire, discharge, discriminate in
working conditions or compensation, or segregate or limit employees
in disadvantageous ways. 261 Nor may employment agencies, labor
unions, or training programs treat anyone unfavorably on the basis of
predictive genetic information. 262 Employers may collect predictive
genetic information about employees only within the strictures of
narrow programs for monitoring toxic substance risks and only with
the employee's consent. 263 Similarly, any information acquired
through such programs may be disclosed only with the employee's
consent or for certain federally approved purposes. 26 4
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle promised early action on
the bill, 265 which has more than 250 bipartisan cosponsors and the
President's promised support. 266 Whether the measure will pass and,
in the end, prove effective remains unclear. House Republicans have
declined to hold hearings on earlier versions of this proposed bill for
the previous five years, 267 insisting even on. the day after the human
genome code's mapping was announced that there had ''been no
incidence of genetic discrimination that anyone can point to at this
period of time." 268
258. § 201.
259. Id.
260. See Suter, supra note 25, at 671.
261. See § 202.
262. §§ 203·05.
263. § 202.
264. § 206.
265. See Dave Boyer & Audrey Hudson, Lieberman Assumes Bush Watchdog Post Promises
Oversight of Energy Policy, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), June 8, 2001, at A1. "It's time for our laws to
catch up with our science. We can't take one step forward in science, but two steps backwards in
civil rights." I d.
266. See Ed Timms, 'Genetic Discrimination' Condemned: Bush, Lawmakers Favor Protection
in Employment, Health Insurance, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 24, 2001, at 4A.
267. The current sponsor has lamented that "we have had so much trouble getting hearings
on this." Sanger, supra note 50.
268. Genetic Data: Genetie Privacy Laws Unlikely This Year, AMERICAN HEALTH LINE, June
28, 2000, available at http://www.americanhealthline.com.
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Some participants in the debate about genetic discrimination
have questioned the need for new federal legislation. For example,
Senator Jim Jeffords has suggested that the ADA may offer adequate
protection against genetic discrimination. 269 We do not enter this
debate directly here, except to note that new federal legislation would
face difficulties of interpretation and application similar to those the
ADA has encountered.
There is, first, a question about how efficaciously federal
can
constrain
states
from
antidiscrimination
regulations
discriminating against prospective and present employees on the basis
of predictive genetic information. The Supreme Court has struck down
the application of certain provisions of both the ADA (in Board of
Trustees u. Garrett 270 ) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(in Kimel u. Florida Board of Regents 271 ) to states in view of their
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 272 In both these cases, the Court
declared that Congress did not have sufficient evidence of pervasive
historical discrimination on the proscribed basis by the states, which
is the sole condition under which a civil rights approach can constrain
state sovereignty. 273 There is less historical evidence, not more, that
states have discriminated on the basis of predictive genetic
information. 274
Second, there is the matter of workers' ability to carry out the
essential functions of the job. Employers often claim to be protecting
workers who are at higher than usual risk of workplace-induced
illnesses or injuries by excluding them from jobs that may harm
them. 275 Are workers who are regarded as needing such protection
unable to execute functions essential to the job because proximity to
necessary work is a personal hazard? If so, should employers be
required to continue their employment?
Third, will it be effective to forbid employers to be influenced
by protected genetic information when making employment decisions?
269. See Discrimination: Jeffords Examining Need for Legislation on Genetic Discrimination;
Coalitions Forming, supra note 133.
270. 531 u.s. 356 (2001).
271. 528 u.s. 62 (2000).
272. Id. at 66.
273. See id. at 90-91; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
274. The sterilization of individuals with certain kinds of hiological and behavioral
characteristics could be cited as an early form of genetic discrimination. See David Pfeiffer,
Eugenics and Disability Discrimination, 9 DISABILITY Soc'y 481 (1994); Burgdorf & Burgdorf,
supra note 147. However, this evidence, cited in congressional hearings during the debate on the
ADA and in briefs filed in Garrett, was deemed insufficient proof of historical discrimination by
states despite Justice Breyer's vociferous dissent. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369-70.
275. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
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We believe it will not. The legislation's protection does not extend to
important kinds of information. Terri Sergeant's case illustrates the
problem. Sergeant's employer could have gained knowledge about her
genetic condition from several sources, not all of which qualify as
protected under House Bill 602. Data pointing to Sergeant's condition
included the history of her sibling's illness and death, medical
appointments to treat chronic respiratory problems that Sergeant
attributed to an allergy, positive genetic test results for Alpha-1
antitrypsin, and medical records and bills for $45,000 annually for
preventive treatment. 276 House Bill 602 would prohibit Sergeant's
employer from basing an employment decision on the first and third
items on this list, but not on the second and fourth. 277 Indeed, all the
information the employer needs to identify her genetic condition is
manifested in the record of her prophylactic treatment. An Internet
search will quickly identify the conditions for which the treatment is
prescribed. 278 Granted, knowing her family history might also offer a
clue, but the employee would have difficulty establishing that this
protected information was crucial.
Thus, the ban on using predictive genetic information does not
protect against unfavorable personnel actions that are prompted by
beliefs about employees' dispositions to genetic illness. One of the
main benefits an individual obtains from predictive genetic
information about herself is the foreknowledge to take preventive or
mitigating measures. 279 Information that the employee is taking such
measures is not protected. An employer concerned with eliminating
workers with genetic susceptibility to asbestosis or mesothelioma from
contact with asbestos fibers could identify behaviors that frequently
occur when individuals learn of their susceptibility: ceasing to smoke,
meticulous use of masks, and so on. On the basis of this information,
which would not be protected under the provisions of House Bill 602,
the employer could take action. Here the employer could claim to be
responding to the threat the workplace poses to the worker and, in
fact, could claim that relieving the employee of her assignment
276. See Alpha-1, supra note 159.
277. See H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001). Many of the state laws that address genetic
discrimination are similar to House Bill 602 in this respect. See National Human Genome
Research Institute, Genetic Information and Health Insurance Enacted Legislation, at
http:l/www.nhgri.nih.gov/Policy_and_public_affairs/Legislation/insure.htm (last visited Aug. 26,
2002) (charting enacted state legislation that addresses genetic information and health
insurance as of April 29, 2002).
278. Tamoxifen, for instance, is quickly identified as a medication used to reduce the
incidence of breast cancer simply by typing the name of the drug into any major Internet search
engine.
279. See supra Part LB.
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safeguards a worker who already has. signaled her desire not to
become ill.
Analysis of Terri Sergeant's claim raises another difficult
question common to genetic antidiscrimination law, regardless of
whether the law is provided by the ADA or specialized legislation.
This is the problem of determining who will be protected and who will
not, when no bright line separates vulnerable from safe and deserving
from undeserving populations.
In an attempt to limit the population protected by the ADA,
courts have constructed a high threshold for protection under the
"disabled" prong, while there currently is uncertainty and a lack of
clarity about who is eligible for protection under the "regarded as"
prong. 280 A similar problem would occur for individuals seeking
protection under the provisions of House Bill 602. Whether an
individual is presymptomatic or symptomatic often is not very clear.
For example, a person who finds herself under stress and forgetting
things might describe these circumstances to a physician. (Forgetting
things is not a strict indicator of Alzheimer's disease, as demonstrated
by the young parents who lock their cars on sweltering summer days,
forgetting that their infants are inside.) Knowing that this patient's
family has a history of early onset Alzheimer's disease, the physician
orders genetic testing, which gives a positive result for a gene
associated with Alzheimer's disease. An examination of the patient's
cognitive functioning, with attention to the cognitive deficits
diagnostic of Alzheimer's disease, is inconclusive. Although no
diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease can be made on the existing evidence,
the physician starts the patient on Aricept as a prophylactic to delay
cognitive impairment just in case the patient's memory problems
signal the development of Alzheimer's. 281 In this case, an employer
who regards the employee as likely to develop Alzheimer's could claim
to have based personnel decisions on inferences made from the
unprotected parts of the medical record (the patient's report of
memory problems and the prescription for Aricept) but not from the
protected parts (the genetic testing and family history). As the
Sergeant case and this case both show, prescribing medication to ward

280. See Travis, Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 217.
281. Aricept is relatively nontoxic, and clinical studies suggest that very early admini·
stration can delay symptom development by approximately two years. See generally David S.
Knopman, Management of Cognition and Function: New Results from the Clinical Trials
Programme Of Aricept® (Donepezil Hcl), INT'L J. NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY, July 2000, at 13;
David G. Wilkinson, The Pharmacology of Donepezil: A New Treatment of Alzheimer's Disease, 1
EXPERT 0PIN. PHARMACOTHERAPY 121 (1999).
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off onset of disease in individuals whom genetic tests show to be at
risk may be as revealing as the test results themselves.
Individuals claiming harm from genetic discrimination may
have to establish that the harm occurred prior to any sign of their
condition and· indeed, prior to the employer's imagining such a sign.
With respect to relief under the ADA, questions about the extent of
plaintiffs' overall limitations often seem to preempt questions about
plaintiffs' competence to perform the requirements of the job.
Similarly, questions about whether an employer's decision was
influenced by unprotected parts of the medical record, rather than by
the results of genetic tests or family history, may preempt questions
about whether a genetic condition makes an employee unable to
perform the requirements of the job. Because prophylactic
prescriptions are separate from the protected record, individuals who
use genetic information to pursue preventive measures to benefit their
health may, in doing so, lose their legal recourse against genetic
discrimination. Thus, the purpose of genetic antidiscrimination law,
namely, to free citizens to improve their health through applications of
genomic know ledge, may not be realized.
IV. DECIDING WHO SHOULD BE PROTECTED

The ADA, as well as current and proposed genetic
discrimination laws, bifurcates the population into protected and
unprotected groups. Both approaches leave the large group of
presymptomatic individuals who take steps to delay potential genetic
disease unprotected from discrimination. Excluding this latter
category of individuals from social opportunities is unjustifiable on
probabilistic grounds and enormously costly to society. To ensure that
this group of individuals receives equality of opportunity, we advocate
their inclusion in the classification of the population safeguarded from
genetic discrimination, along the lines of protection extended to race
and sex. Last, we discuss what such paradigm-shifting legislation
would entail.
A. Bifurcating the Population

No matter what their race and sex, regardless of whether they
are identified with a dominant or a minority group, all citizens may, in
principle, seek recourse through the law if they are harmed by race or
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sex discrimination. 282 In contrast, courts have seen federal legislation
that protects against disability discrimination as bifurcating the
population. 283 Many state statutes that protect against genetic
discrimination, as well as prospective federal legislation to protect
against genetic discrimination, invite the same interpretation. 284 Each
might be understood to create two classes, one that benefits from the
law's protection and one that is bereft of it.
The ADA has been read as extending civil rights protection to
individuals whose physical or mental impairments substantially limit
their participation in major life activities, or who are so regarded, 285
but giving no protection to individuals who can adapt to or mitigate
their impairments sufficiently to engage substantially in such
activities. 286 On the other hand, proposed specialized legislation that
targets genetic discrimination will protect individuals until they
evidence limitation of life activities or some other readily observable
sign of their propensity for, or manifestation of, genetic disease. 287 The
protected population is thus almost a reverse mirror image of the
population protected by the ADA, but once again, individuals who take
mitigating measures are unprotected.2ss
Ironically, neither the disability discrimination approach nor
the attempt to provide separate protection from genetic discrimination
shields people who take mitigating measures to escape dysfunction. 289
Further, the lines drawn between protected and unprotected groups
do not reflect the difference between people who can and cannot
function successfully. Thus, the ADA fails to protect a significant
group of people. who have impairments but nevertheless can do the
job. For example, in Kirkingburg, the Supreme Court ruled that an
individual, fired as a truck driver because he was blind in one eye, was
not protected under the ADA. 290 Kirkingburg's brain forfeited his ADA
protection when, in a process still not understood by cognitive science,
it enabled him to judge depth accurately with only one eye. 291 The
282. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1436-1672 (2d ed.
1988).
283. See supra Part III.D.
284. Id.
285. See Travis, supra note 217.
286. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
287. See National Human Genome Research Institute, supra note 277.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-67 (1999).
291. Id. at 565. Depth perception usually is binocular, but some individuals apparently adapt
to being monocular by correlating visual cues of light and darkness, and perspectives created by
tiny head movements, so as to make accurate visual judgments about depth. See Wolfgang
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bottom line here is that, although Kirkingburg's monocular
performance satisfied the standards set for binocular individuals, the
Court's reading of the law denied him the opportunity binocular
people enjoy and, in doing so, decreased his scope of productivity. 292
Analogously, an individual who, on the basis of a positive genetic test
result, takes measures to block a genetic condition from producing
dysfunction likely forfeits protection against discrimination when he
takes preventive action to preserve his productivity. Thus, existing
approaches to both disability discrimination and genetic
discrimination fail in large part to reduce the costs of excluding
otherwise productive citizens from equal opportunity.

B. Statistical Probability and Social Cost
Some people believe that genetic discrimination accurately
targets real biological inferiorities. 293 Under this view, to which many
ascribe, 294 genetic ·variations are perceived as important differences
that may warrant assignment to inferior social status and justify
inequality of protection. 295 Is this discrimination? And if so, who
should be protected against genetic discrimination? Although everyone
is equally protected against race or sex discrimination, courts have
bridled at protecting everyone equally against disability
discrimination. Should everyone be protected equally against genetic
discrimination? Congresswoman Slaughter, the author and cosponsor
of House Bill602, has correctly remarked that everyone has some "bad
genes." 296 Nonetheless, is it justifiable-either economically or
morally-to extend to everyone the protection that everyone needs? 297
Skrandies, The Processing of Stereoscopie Information in Human Visual Cortex: Psychophysical
and Electrophysiological Evidence, CLINICAL ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY, July 2001, at 152;
Christopher W. Tyler & Leonid L. Kontsevich, Stereoprocessing of Cyclopean Depth Images:
Horizontally Elongated Summation Fields, 41 VISION RESEARCH 2235 (2001).
292. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565-67.
293. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
294. For example, two prominent media columnists subscribe to this view. See Andrew
Sullivan, Ban on Use of Genetic Data by Employers, Insurers is Irrational, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Aug. 6, 2000, at G-1. (decrying the analogy between genetic discrimination and
racial discrimination as "bogus" and averring that "the sooner we get over our handwringing, the
better"); Michael Kinsley, Genetic Correctness, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2000, at A29 (maintaining
that divergent treatment based upon genetics is "discrimination that makes perfect sense").
295. See supra note 294.
296. Subcomm. on Commerce Hearing, supra note 254.
297. The question of group membership, especially as it pertains to disability, is an
especially pertinent and difficult one that goes beyond the boundaries of this Article, but is one
that we have begun to address elsewhere. See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability,

Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and
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Excluding instances of purposeful prejudice (or "distaste"), 298
discrimination may occur when a decisionmaker, lacking perfect
informaJtion about the characteristics of the members of a given group,
bases her assessment on inaccurate "indicators" that she believes can
evaluate those individuals' present or future performance. 299 Some of
these assessments may be irrational.3oo
Genetic discrimination targets a DNA anomaly, real or
imagined, and assigns individuals with that anomaly to the
"abnormal" group. 301 Some members of the group will eventually
express symptoms of particular illnesses (with varying degrees of
functional limitations), while others will not. 302 As the result of genetic
discrimination, however, all members of the group must accept
inferior employment opportunities on the presumption that society
has an acceptable interest in excluding them. 303 This result transpires
mainly because as a culture we do not yet understand that predictive
genetic testing's usefulness as a basis for preventive health care does
not make it an equally useful basis for predicting personal
performance. Although reliable scientific knowledge is growing
exponentially in the field of genomics, there also exists huge potential

Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 MICH. L. REV. 81 (2002); Anita Silvers &
Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Race, Social Construction, and Group Identity (unpublished
manuscript on file with authors); Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, From Plessy (1896) and
Goesart (1948) to Cleburne (1985) and Garrett (2001): A Chill Wind From the Past Blows Equal
Protection Away, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE AMERICANS WITH DISABIUTIES ACT: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTNES (forthcoming 2002). Other noteworthy treatments are Mark Kelman, Market
Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833 (2001) and Samuel A. Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and Disability, 86 VA. L. REV. 397 (2000).
298. The seminal writing on "distaste" is by Nobel Prize-winning economist (and journalist)
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-45 (2d ed. 1971).
299. For an appraisal of how this phenomenon affects the labor market participation of
disabled workers, see Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with
Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314 (2000). Additionally, general policy misassessments
are described in Silvers & Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing

at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, supra
note 297.
300. See Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor
Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1977). As to the efficiency of these types of
determinations, see Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 513, 516 (1987); Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Diserimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
228 (1986).
301. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY, supra
note 35, at 59-115.
302. See infra notes 320-25 and accompanying text.
303. See EPSTEIN, supra note 293.
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for erroneous predictive decisionmaking. This inaccuracy can be traced
to two causes--one social, the other scientific.304
The values of individuals who conduct genetic tests can influence
their interpretation of the results. 305 For example, research by Dr. Paul
Billings and his colleagues indicates that people commit base-rate
judgment errors in overassessing the chances of contracting illnesses
produced by genetic factors relative to nongenetically induced
conditions. 306 Another study, this time by state insurance
commissioners, found that respondents consistently ignored base-rate
conditions relative to genetic manifestations. 307 Statistically, students
and staff at Harvard Medical School fared even worse in a study of
interpretive base rates. 308 When asked, "[I]f a test to detect a .disease
whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of [five percent],
what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result actually
has the disease, assuming you know nothing about the person's
symptoms or signs?", almost half responded ninety-five percent, with
only about one-filth answering correctly (two percent). 309 If sophisticated
professionals can make systematic mistakes when interpreting genetic
information, then the decisions of businesses utilizing that information
may not be accurate.
Furthermore, actual predictive genetic testing itself manifests a
wide range of clinical utility (i.e., precision) and therefore may not be a
likely indicator of productivity. 310 As mentioned above, 311 the accuracy
with which a genetic test predicts the onset of disease depends on
many factors, including variances in gene expression, a test's technical
304. Although it is not our view, some individuals claim that these errors are purposefully
linked. See RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: HOW GENETIC
INFORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS,
INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS AND LAW ENFORCERS (1993).
305. See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Genetic Discrimination and the

Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Emerging Legal, Empirical, and
Poliey Implications, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 411 (1996) (providing the sources cited infra notes 30609).
306. See Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J.
HUMAN GENETICS 476, 480 (1992).
307. See Jean E. McEwan et al., A Survey of State Insurance Commissioners Concerning
Genetic Testing and Life Insurance, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 785 (1992).
308. See Ward Casscells et al., Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory Results,
299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 999, 1000 (1978).
309. Id.
310. See National Institutes of Health, Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing,
A Public Consultation on Oversight of Genetic Tests, at 9 (1999-2000), available at
http://www.edc.org/SACGT/id48.htm [hereinafter NIH-SACGT] (on file with author). "Clinical
utility refers to the degree to which benefits are provided by positive and negative test results."

I d.
311. See supra Part I.A.
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precision, and the stability of linkage between genetic markers and
suspect genes. 312 Some genetic tests suffer from a high occurrence of
false positives and/or false negatives.3 13 Moreover, genetic
recombination can interfere with the predictive value of genomics. 314
Consequently, predictive genetic testing "contains a substantial
component of uncertainty," not only as to whether a given condition
will express itself, but also when and how severely this expression will
appear. 315
In addition, the predictive value of a test depends heavily upon
the nature of the disease for which it tests. 316 First, only a few
diseases are caused by genetic anomalies with one hundred percent
expression-that is, genes whose presence invariably leads to
development of the disease. 317 One such example is multiple endocrine
neoplasia type 2, a rare disorder resulting from mutations in the RET
protooncogene that is nearly certain to develop into medullary thyroid
carcinoma. 31 8 By contrast, perhaps fifty to sixty percent of women who
inherit the "defective" mutations of the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene
associated with cancer will develop breast or ovarian cancer during
their lifetimes. 319 Accordingly, interpreting the presence of any
particular gene as meaning that an individual will categorically
manifest a correlated health condition is not statistically supportable.
Second, while predictive genetic testing can be useful in
identifying which individuals from the population are at increased
risk, estimates of penetrance-the proportion of individuals with a
particular genetic susceptibility who will in fact develop the associated
condition 320-vary tremendously. In circumstances involving defective
BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes, penetrance estimates for breast cancer range
from thirty-six to eighty-five percent and for ovarian cancer from ten

312. An excellent treatment is James P. Evans et al., The Complexities of Predictive Genetic
Testing, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 1052 (April 28, 2001).
313. Id. at 1053.
314. Id. at 1054.
315. Id. at 1053.
316. Id. at 1053-54.
317. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY, supra
note 35, at 59-ll5.

318. See A.O. Hoff et al., Multiple Endocrine Neoplasias, 62 ANN. REV. PHYSIOLOGY 377
(2000); C.A. Stratakis & D.W. Ball, A Concise Genetic and Clinical Guide to Multiple Endocrine
Neoplasias and Related Syndromes, 13 J. PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINOLOGY METABOLISM 457 (2000).
319. See Elizabeth B. Claus et al., The Genetic Attributable Risk of Breast and Ovarian
Cancer, 77 CANCER 2318 (1996).
320. See Paolo Vineis et al., Misconceptions About the Use of Genetic Tests in Populations,
357 LANCET 709 (2001); see also Howard Hughes Medical Center, Blazing a Genetic Trail:
Glossary, at http://www.hhmi.org/genetictrail/glossary/glossary.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2002).
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to forty-four percent. 321 Thus, although the presence of particular
genes may identify individuals as belonging to an increased risk group
(an extremely useful category from a public health perspective), the
likelihood of those genes expressing, if at all, is unclear. 322 Thus, with
few exceptions, extrapolating from the presence of given genetic
anomalies to a prediction that the individual will develop the
associated disabilities is not statistically provable.
Additionally, a single gene can carry many different mutations,
and a disease can be associated with mutations of many genes. Over
eight hundred different mutations of genes associated with cystic
fibrosis have been identified. 323 Some of these will cause the disease to
manifest in varying degrees of severity, and some will have no effect at
all. 324 Furthermore, identical mutations in such genes will affect
individuals from different populations to different degrees because of
variations in environmental factors. 325 A particular genetic mutation
may also have effects different from the one that is being investigated.
For instance, in the future, scientists could discover that having a
particular breast cancer gene mutation correlates with immunity from
AIDS (as sickle-cell trait correlates with heightened immunity to
malaria). Thus, an employer screening for and then discriminating
against individuals with a genetic predisposition to breast cancer
because of the costs associated with that illness might end up excluding
employees with immunity to higher-cost illnesses. To do so would not
only be illogical, it would also increase individual costs.
Nevertheless, the view that not all people warrant protection
appears to emerge from concern about the costs of covering everyone
alike. For example, a recent article by prominent law professors Colin
Diver and Jane Cohen maintains that banning genetic discrimination
within the employment market would "cause significant welfare losses
due to the distortion of allocative efficiency."326 In sum, Diver and
Cohen begin from a neoclassical model of the labor market, one that
presumes that voluntary exchanges between willing and informed

321. See Steinunn Thorlacius et al., Population-Based Study of Risk of Breast Cancer in
Carriers of BRCA2 Mutation, 352 LANCET 1337 (1998); D. Ford et al., Risks of Cancer in BRCAJMutation Carriers, 343 LANCET 692 (1994).
322. Id.
323. See NIH-SACGT, supra note 310, at 7.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What is Wrong with Genetic
Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1445 (2001). They also erroneously assert that a ban
on genetic testing would harm equality of opportunity. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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individuals are "the paradigm of efficiency-enhancing transaction." 327
Consequently, the withholding of genetic information from employers
by individuals with genetic anomalies causes unjustified "significant
efficiency losses." 328 This loss occurs because rendering that
information exclusive to its owners prevents employers from properly
assessing (and penalizing) the presumed lower productivity and
higher costs associated with those conditions.32 9
Diver and Cohen's assessment fails for three main reasons. The
first is that they make the same presumptive errors detailed above
regarding the accuracy of (and accordingly the justification for relying
upon) predictive testing. 330 Their argument stands up only if genetic
screening can accurately predict whether a debilitating condition will
be expressed by an anomalous gene and can correctly assess whether
and to what extent a given individual will be functionally impaired. As
we have argued, available scientific evidence demonstrates that this
level of precision has not yet been achieved. 33 1
Yet, even if predictive testing could make these
prognostications, Diver and Cohen also err in their assertion that
economic efficiency therefore mandates the allowance of genetic
discrimination within the employment market. 332 Strong policy
reasons, in fact, militate against such a conclusion. To begin with,
everyone is vulnerable to genetic discrimination because we each have
some atypical or anomalous genes that may, in the future, become
suspect as new scientific knowledge expands the pool of individuals
believed to be at heightened risk for genetic dysfunction. 333
Permitting the exclusion of a larger number of individuals on
the basis of their genetic susceptibilities may be an exercise in
rational exclusion from an individual employer's personal point of
view because it reduces the chance that these individuals will
manifest symptoms and require a disability-related accommodation or
327. Diver & Cohen, supra note 326, at 1460. For a critique of this model as applied to
disabled workers, see Stein, supra note 299; Michael Ashley Stein, Market Failure and ADA Title
I, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS 193 (2000).
328. Diver & Cohen, supra note 326, at 1460.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See supra Part III.B.
332. Diver & Cohen, supra note 326, at 1460. Of course, much of the assessment depends on
what one factors into the notion of social good. An extremely articulate treatment (also
acknowledged by Diver and Cohen) is provided by Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social
Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, llO YALE L.J. 173 (2000). See also Michael
Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title I, 85 IOWAL. REV. 1671 (2000).
333. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY, supra
note 35, at 59·115.
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increase group-based insurance costs. 334 Nevertheless, it is neither
economically efficient nor in the interests of the general society and
the collective good to keep productive individuals out of the economy
and thereby require that resources be devoted to them while they
themselves do not generate productive goods.
This last point can be illustrated in concrete terms. Studies
show that hiring people with disabilities generally lowers taxpayers'
burdens 335 and benefits the national economy. 336 In large part, this is
due to reducing expenditures on disability-related public assistance
obligations, currently estimated at $120 billion annually. 337
Pertinently, one report estimates that for every one million disabled
people employed, there would be as much as a $21.2 billion annual
increase in earned income, a $2.1 billion decrease in means-tested
cash income payments, a $286 million annual decrease in the use of
food stamps, a $1.8 billion decrease in Supplemental Security Income
payments, 284,000 fewer people using Medicaid, and 166,000 fewer
people using Medicare. 338
Consequently, society's interests in achieving the most
productive overall arrangement of its citizens overrides the individual
employer's interests in reducing the risk that their particular cohorts
of workers will be less net-productive. 339 Moreover, leaving
asymptomatic·or presymptomatic individuals unprotected impedes the
realization of the precise public health benefits and related savings in
health-care costs that genomics was supposed to achieve.

334. Many of the same arguments used to be rolled out to defend excluding people of color or
women from desirable workplaces. See EPSTEIN, supra note 293; Tribe, supra note 282.
335. See, e.g., The JWOD Program: Providing Cost Savings to the Federal Government by
Employing People with Disabilities (Feb. 6, 1998) (listing survey results and reporting that the
federal government saved $1,963,206 over the course of the study by employing 270 people with
disabilities) (on file with Iowa Law Review); Taxpayer Return Study California Department of
Rehabilitation Mental Health Cooperative Programs (Oct. 1995) (finding that for every disabled
person employed, California taxpayers saved an average of $629 per month in costs) (on file with
Iowa Law Review).
336. See generally Thomas N. Chirakos, Aggregate Economic Losses from Disability in the
United States: A Preliminary Assay, 67 MILBANK Q. 59 (Supp. 2, pt. 11989).
337. See David I. Levine, Reinventing Disability Policy 1 (lnst. of Indus. Relations, Working
Paper No. 65, 1997), at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/niir/wpapers/pdf/65.pdf.
338. See Patricia Digh, People with Disabilities Show What They Can Do, HR MAG., June
1998, at 141 (citing Rutgers University economist Douglas Kruse).
339. See Lawrence 0. Gotsin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based
Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109 (1991).
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C. The Equality Model
Underlying much of the concern regarding costs voiced by
commentators such as Diver and Cohen is a mistaken notion about
what is required in order to guarantee individuals' equality of
opportunity within the context of genetic difference. 340 They are
correct in their formulation of the general premise that egalitarianism
"posits that every human being deserves an equal opportunity to
achieve her potential or her life's goals" so that a just society is under
"a moral obligation to redress barriers to equal opportunity." 341
Nonetheless, when Diver and Cohen apply this notion of equality to
the area of genetic discrimination, they do so incorrectly.
First, they argue that protection against genetic discrimination
privileges individuals on the basis of their "brute luck" in having
inherited propensities for genetic disease. 342 This contention errs
because it relies on the mistaken idea that to refrain from
disadvantaging an individual is to privilege that individual.
Incorrectly assuming that the individuals in question will be less
productive, Diver and Cohen imagine that protection against genetic
discrimination means that less-qualified individuals will be preferred
to more qualified individuals through mechanisms of "coerced
altruism." 343 This assumption is misguided, however. To have the
misfortune to inherit anomalous genes through no fault of one's own
in no way equates with being less productive.
Second, they mistakenly reformulate their premise about equal
opportunity as a principle that an individual's success in the "race of
life" should not be determined by "the 'brute luck' of the natural or
social lottery." 344 To the contrary, most proponents of equality of
opportunity do not propose to address natural differences. Instead,
they seek the elimination of artificial-that is, socially imposedbarriers to the exercise of natural talents. 345 Some equal opportunity
theorists-for instance, the bioethicist Norman Daniels-argue that
we must provide medical care to people disadvantaged by poor health,
340. Because it is well-written and recent, we utilize Diver and Cohen's article as a proxy for
other commentators but stress that our criticisms are not limited to the aforementioned.
341. Diver & Cohen, supra note 326, at 1471. Variations abound as to what exactly the
opportunity to achieve equality requires. A primer on equality theory would include RONALD M.
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000), JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999), and AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).
342. Diver & Cohen, supra note 326, at 1471.
343. See id. at 1473.
344. ld. at 1480.
345. See Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (1998).
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but only in cases and to the extent that there are treatments to restore
them to a physical state in which equality of opportunity becomes
meaningful for them. 346 Apparently Diver and Cohen have confused
equality of opportunity with a view often thought to be its strong
opponent, namely, the principle adopted by welfarists that justice
requires equality of outcomes, not just equality of opportunity.347
In doing so, they also suggest that employers will be
statistically correct in promoting biological species-typicality in their
employees, for instance, by offering fitness and wellness programs. 348
In general, Diver and Cohen underestimate the force with which
promoting species-typicality creates aversion to·genetic anomaly. For
example, they insist that genetic aversion does not affect "the
preference function of most people." 349 Diver and Cohen make this
claim primarily based upon the assumption that genetic anomalies are
"hidden."35o They therefore suppose that most people do not consider
genetic anomalies in dealing with one another.3 51 In doing so, they
apparently overlook the fact that most genetic anomalies have
observable manifestations, and that the history of eugenics programs
fully demonstrates how averse society has been toward individuals
believed to carry inherited anomalies. 352
A central problem for many commentators who consider the
implications of genetic difference is that they label genetic differences
as diseases rather than acknowledging that those differences
sometimes also indicate when certain individuals may be at greater
risk of disease. In ·so doing, they import a criterion of genetic
normality which, in a thoughtful and prescient article published in
1995, Susan M. Wolf termed "Geneticism." 353 Wolf cautioned that
approaches to genetic discrimination may mistakenly focus on
individual acts of discrimination rather than on the practice that
promotes discrimination, namely, "creating genetic categories, actively
looking for any kind of information about people in order to sort them
346. Daniels asserts this thesis in many places, including
ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 290 (1987).
347. See generally NEAL DEVINS & DAVISON M. DOUGLAS,
(providing different visions of what constitutes equality).
348. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 326, at 1477.
349. Id. at 1465.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. For example, they ignore Justice Holmes's infamous
sterilization on the ground that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles
u.s. 200, 207 (1927).
353. See Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination':·
Geneticism, 23 J.L. MED. ETHICS 345, 346 (1995).

his chapter in HEALTH CARE
REDEFINING EQUALITY (1998)

justification of state·imposed
are enough." Buck v. Bell, 274

Toward the Broader Harm of
.
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into those categories, and harboring attitudes and prejudices that
motivate such behavior." 354 She believed that formal equality theory
requires groups manifesting differences to be treated as if they had
none of these differences. 355 Thus, she argued, when applied to
genetics, antidiscrimination policy cannot help but presume that
"there is such a thing as a 'normal' genotype, and that the goal is to
change the treatment of people who deviate." 356 In reality, however,
there is no natural biological underclass, for "[t]here is nothing
neutral or scientifically 'real' about identifying a genetic norm" for as
"no one actually possesses this fictive 'normal' genotype, it is
completely unclear what it means to treat someone as if they did have
it."357
Wolf argued that as a society we must not be misled into
thinking that a strategy that failed in regard to sex discriminationnamely, attempting to assimilate members of a subordinated group to
the dominant group-will work for genetic discrimination. 35 B By
reifying the properties of the dominant group into "a norm that does
not exist," assimilation serves to "merely entrench genetic bias." 359
Such an approach "instantiates a norm that does not exist" and serves
to "merely entrench genetic bias." 360 Wolf also argued that as a society
we must go beyond an approach to genetics paralleling early sex
antidiscrimination theory that seeks to treat members of the
subordinate group (women/those with known genetic anomalies) like
members of the dominant group (men/those without known genetic
anomalies)." 361 We must abandon the stereotype that individuals with
genetic variations are deviant, abnormal, or defective rather than
simply variant. Instead, policymakers and theorists ought to learn
from work done in the areas of race and sex362 to understand that the

354. Id. at 347.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 348.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 350.
359. Id. at 345·46.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Representative literature includes the following: CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiserimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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practice of treating people differently based on their different genome
type must be discontinued. 363
We agree with many of Wolfs assertions and take notice of her
concerns. We are, however, more cautious than she about the
usefulness of jettisoning equality as a value. We do not believe that
equality-based paradigms necessarily impose the characteristics of the
dominant or most populous group on other groups as norms or
standards. Indeed, as we shall argue, equality invites a methodology
that acknowledges the differences between. groups but eschews
unfounded inferences based on these differences. 364 In sum, we do not
object as strongly as Wolf to "seeing people as their genes" 365 because
we think it possible for formal justice to acknowledge differences in
genetic identity without using "genetic notions to privilege some
individuals and subordinate others."366
Effective protection against genetic discrimination is not easy
to achieve. Because protecting against genetic discrimination also
requires promoting the important social and cultural change of
rejecting "species-typicality," approaches to genetic discrimination
that are analogous to formal equality protections against racial and
sex discrimination may have limited efficacy absent a concurrent shift
in attitudinal perception 367 and in the legal concepts framing
prevention of genetic discrimination. We now turn to this matter.

D. Reconceptualizing the Protected Class
Neither current protection against disability discrimination,
nor current or proposed protection against genetic discrimination,
adequately shields the large group of presymptomatic individuals
using measures to prevent or mitigate potential genetic anomalies
that may never be expressed or that, if expressed, may not manifest as
functional impairments. 368 Moreover, this class of people is one for

363. Literature that pushes this front within the realms of race and sex jurisprudence
includes: Adrienne Asch & Gail Geller, Feminism, Bioethics, and Genetics, in FEMINISM &
BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION (1996); Dorothy E. Roherts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 209 (1995); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45
VAND. L. REV. 313 (1992).
364. See infra Part IV.D.
365. Wolf, supra note 353, at 346.
366. Id.; see also Silvers, supra note 345, at 13-146.
367. Or, as Wolf puts it, "Too much discussion of genetic disadvantage proceeds as if scholars
of race and gender had not spent decades critiquing and developing antidiscrimination theory."
Wolf, supra note 353, at 345.
368. See supra Part III.

1392

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1341

whom opportunity will be productive and whose productivity
otherwise might be lost to the community. 369
We therefore propose extending genetic discrimination
protection to the general population by prohibiting discrimination
towards individuals "on the basis of their genetic identity." Such a
proscription, with language borrowed from Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964370-the central protection against race or sex
discrimination371-would tailor genetic antidiscrimination protection to
those instances when employers utilize genetic information as the
grounds for inequitably reducing opportunities because of stereotypic
beliefs about the significance of the individuals' genetic identity.
Case law applying proscriptions against discrimination on the
basis of race and sex now proceeds from the initial presumption that
the prevalent characteristic of all protected individuals is their
competence to perform, with a subcategory of individuals within the
classification who will be unable to so function. 372 This initial
presumption will either be borne out or disproved by empirical
evidence when particular actions are challenged. 373 In line with our
current treatment of racial minorities and women, the burden of proof
in genetic discrimination cases should shift from requiring individuals
who are anomalous to demonstrate that they can be competent and
productive despite being anomalous to requiring whoever would
exclude them from productive opportunity based on their anomalies to
prove that they are not.374
For purposes of the law, the population of the legal
classification of genetically anomalous people would be characterized
not in terms of stereotypes but, instead, through empirical study of
the relevant biological groups. We would cease to use genetic
anomalies as proxies for performance limitations. People with higher
than typical risk of genetic disease as a class would be presumed to
remain viable employees, even though some will not be so. Except
perhaps in cases of genes with perfect (one hundred percent)

369. See supra Part N.A-C.
370. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
371. Id.
372. The following discussion draws from parallel arguments we make in two forthcoming
pieces: Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of
Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, supra note 297; From Plessy
(1896) and Goesart (1948) to Cleburne (1985) and Garrett (2001): A Chill Wind From the Past
Blows Equal Protection Away, supra note 297.
373. See supra note 372.
374. Id.
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penetrance, 375 the presumption would be that members of the class of
genetically anomalous people will remain competent and productive,
although a subclass will not be so, rather than that class membership ·
means future deficiency. 376
Here we borrow from contemporary constructions of the legal
classifications of race and sex. For example, half a century ago, equal
protection did not reach women because, as a class, they were
characterized as unable to defend themselves and others, even though
only a subclass of women actually was too weak to do so. 377 Today, the
class of women generally is thought capable in this regard, 378 although
presumably the existence of a subclass too weak to do so remains the
same. 379 We argue that equality entails a methodological prohibition
against the general characterization of members of some
classifications, but not of others, in terms of the limitations of a
subgroup of the classification. 380 Thus, for instance, we think that
equal protection requires that women in general not be classified as
unable to defend themselves because a subclass cannot do so unless
men in general also are so classified in recognition of the subclass of
men who cannot defend themselves.381
Broadly, constructing classifications on an equality basis
means that no one may be treated with less favorable presumptions,
nor bear a heavier burden of proof, by virtue of being assigned to a
group that is thought to be biologically atypical. Such an equalitybased approach to classification addresses Wolfs concern that
characteristics associated with one genetic class become a standard for
members of other classes. According to this approach to equality,
characteristics of the members of one genetic classification may not be
made into a standard or norm for other classes. Consequently, on this
approach no particular genetic identity is privileged.
On the whole, the law has little patience with legal
classifications construed in probabilistic terms. On the other hand, the
nature of genetic information is such that attributions of genetic
375. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text (discussing varying degrees of
penetrance for diseases such as breast cancer and Huntington's disease).
376. See Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of
Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, supra note 297.
377. See Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948) (upholding a Michigan statute that
prohibited women from being licensed as bartenders except where the bars were owned by their
husbands or fathers).
378. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
379. See Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of
Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, supra note 297.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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identity are inescapably probabilistic. 382 How, then, can legal
classifications do justice to the nature of genetic identity?
Constructing the class of genetically anomalous people as we
have proposed appropriately acknowledges that genomic knowledge
supports judgments that are probable at best. This· approach
recognizes that in most cases genes associated with genetic diseases
have less than one hundred percent penetrance and also that many
genetic diseases are multivariant, meaning that several factors must
combine to induce the onset of symptoms. 383 Individuals who are at
higher than species-typical risk for onset are nevertheless very often
unlikely to become symptomatic. 384 Further, even individuals who are
symptomatic may maintain their competence and productivity,
especially if mitigating measures for their disease can be found. 38 5
It follows that there is at least one other feature our model
requires. The standard of proof for excluding individuals on the basis
of their genetic identities must present a reasonably high bar.
Defending the exclusion of individuals on the basis of their genetic
identities must be far more difficult than a mere showing that their
propensity to a genetic disease is more than species-typical.
The requisite standard of proof must serve the liberty and
opportunity interests of individuals and also satisfy collective social
interests. The latter interests include both the reasonable desire of
citizens to be self-supporting and the reasonable desire of employers to
maintain productive enterprises. We propose a high standard of
protection to align the law with current realities regarding genetic
knowledge. With few exceptions, employers (and society at large)
cannot predict accurately the effect DNA anomalies have on particular
individuals. 386 Placing the hurdle so high for legitimating exclusion
from employment gives courts a clear standard that they can enforce
when faced with the difficult issues raised by genetic discrimination.
Increasingly, medical information will have a genetic
component. We do not argue for the abolition of any use of medical
information in employment decisions. Instead, we take issue with the
selection of proxy characteristics based upon empirically unfounded
stereotypes that lead to the general exclusion of people with genetic
differences regardless of competence or qualification.
382. A balanced treatment of this issue is found in Stewart J. Schwab, Is Statistical
Discrimination Efficient?, AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 1986, at 228, 228-34.
383. See discussion supra Part LA.
384. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY, supra
note 35, at 59-115.
385. Id.
386. See supra Part LA.
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CONCLUSION

We have argued for the creation of an equality-based protection
for genetic discrimination similar to that of race and sex
discrimination. We pointed out that, like race and sex, everyone is
genetically anomalous in some way. That is, everyone exhibits some
differences from genetic species-typicality because species-typicality is
as much an idealized construction as the idea of the "average person."
We showed that, although everyone is genetically anomalous in some
way, the practical and theoretical problems inherent in current
approaches to statutory protection leave many people exposed to
genetic discrimination. In this regard, we explained how the ADA and
genetic discrimination laws both bifurcate the population into
protected and unprotected groups that leave unprotected the group of
presymptomatic individuals who utilize mitigating measures.
What medicine will discover about the problems attendant on
each individual's genetic configuration, and which genetic
configurations any employer may read as being proxies for
unsuitability, is, at present, a lottery. Yet medical research learns
more every day about using genetic information beneficially to prevent
or delay the onset of genetic conditions that may be disadvantageous.
The population of the group that can take such mitigating measures is
growing rapidly.
Excluding this group from social opportunities cannot help but
be enormously costly to the group's members, to society, and, as well,
to our faith that science can improve our lives. To save genomics, the
major scientific achievement of our era, from occasioning such
lamentable outcomes, we have proposed an approach to genetic
discrimination that would protect the people who have the most to lose
and to gain from genomics. Finally, to indicate how implementation of
our proposal can be initiated, we discussed some features of what such
a paradigm-shifting approach would necessitate.

